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COPPERWELD IN THE COURTS:
THE ROAD TO CARIBE
STEPHEN CALKINS*

Many antitrust observers have not appreciated fully the importance
and breadth of Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.' The case's outcome was relatively uncontroversial, and several more celebrated antitrust opinions stole the spotlight of
attention and analysis. 2Justice Breyer has focused attention on Copperweld
by relying heavily on it in one of his last opinions as a circuit judge,
Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, and this
renewed attention may teach us something about Copperweld and perhaps
about Justice Breyer.
The pre-Copperweld intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was a blessing
to litigators (who billed countless hours applying it) and scholars (who
won attention largely by lamenting it), but a curse to students trying to
understand it4 and counselors trying to apply it. It was understood that
"the mere fact that corporations are under common ownership does not
render them incapable of conspiring with each other., 5 Little else was
clear.
Copperweld changed this: one corporation's 100 percent ownership of
another renders them incapable of forming a Sherman Act conspiracy.
This narrow holding was not without importance,
but the antitrust com6
munity greeted it as something of a non-event.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.

'467 U.S. 752 (1984).

2 The October 1983 term, one of the most extraordinary antitrust terms, featured

Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); and NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984);
as well as Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984), and Copperweld.
19 F.3d 745 (1st Cir. 1994).
Cf. PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 337 (2d ed. 1974) (successfully capturing

the confusion).
' ABA ANTITRUST
viewing cases).

SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS

11-14 (2d ed. 1984) (re-

6 Cf. William F. Baxter, Supreme Court Update-HorizontalCases, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 423,
423-25 (1984) (briefly reviewing what he described as "a very, very straightforward opinion,
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It has now been ten years since the Court decided Copperweld. Upon
its issuance the opinion's implications seemed relatively straightforward,
but the history of those implications in subsequent court decisions belies
that initial assessment.' On Copperweld's central issue-determining when
entities are sufficiently separate that Sherman Act conspiracy is possiblelower courts have issued scores of opinions, addressing some easy questions and some moderately tricky ones.' Beyond that, many Sherman
Act opinions have drawn on Copperweld's language and analysis to help
resolve important issues not involving conspiracy determination. 9 Since
much of this language and analysis was suggested by the William Baxterled Antitrust Division, these decisions can be seen as part of that Division's
legacy. Finally, many judges have addressed parties' requests for courts
to apply Copperweld's description of the unity of parents and subsidiaries
to statutes other than the Sherman Act.' ° Even without such a request,
the First Circuit in Caribe chose to apply Copperweld perhaps too quickly
to a difficult price discrimination question.
and one that certainly I welcomed heartily"). In a thoughtful discussion of the likely
implications of Justice Rehnquist's replacing Chief Justice Burger, Professor Campbell
described Rehnquist as "substantially less antitrust enforcement-minded than Chief Justice
Burger." Thomas J. Campbell, Supreme Court Developments, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 457
(1986). In support of this proposition, Campbell noted that of Burger's six antitrust majority
opinions, "four are pro-enforcement; the only two that are less so are Copperweld and
BankAmerica, both of which are rather technical and should not catalogue anyone as lax
on enforcement." Id.(referring to BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122
(1983)).
After Copperweld, antitrust casebook authors, with relief, replaced previous discussions
of an odd, confusing doctrine with either the opinion and a few queries, PHILLIP AREEDA

& Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 1244-46 (4th ed.
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 546-56 (3d

1988); MILTON HANDLER ET
ed. 1990) ("Intra-Enterprise

Conspiracy-A Building Block Largely Abandoned"); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP,ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 300-13 (3d ed. 1994) (adding series
of problems), or with a page or two of text, THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
614-15 (1994); cf. WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN
101-02, 326-33 (2d ed.
1992) (textual treatment briefly noting more general importance).
Copperweld was discussed in Nolan Ezra Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to
the CartelizationStandard,38 VAND. L.REV. 1125 (1985); Diane Wood Hutchinson, Antitrust
1984: Five Decisions in Search of a Theory, in 1984 SUP. Cr. REV. 69 (Philip B. Kurland et
al. eds., 1985); Jennifer Stewart, Comment, The Intra-EnterpriseConspiracy Doctrine After
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 86 COLUM. L. REV. 198 (1986); and John
Archer Thomson, Jr., Case Comment, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.:
The Changing Complexion of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 19
GA. L. REV. 189 (1984). Professor Areeda gave the issue his usual thorough treatment, 7
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 14E (1986).
SA LEXIS search showed that each year beginning in 1984, between 20 and 40 majority
opinions or more relied in part on, or distinguished, Copperveld.
sSee infra Part 11.
9See infra Part II1.
'oSee infra Parts IV & V.
ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS

& C. PAUL

ROGERS

1II,
ANTITRUST

LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE
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I. COPPERWELD
Before reviewing and commenting on the several categories of judicial
treatment of Copperweld, this article briefly discusses that case and the
context in which it arose.
A.

BACKGROUND TO COPPERWELD

It is difficult to imagine a case better than Copperweld for a Supreme
Court petitioner. Regal Tube Co., a steel tubing manufacturer, had been
a wholly owned subsidiary of one firm, an unincorporated division of
another, and finally a wholly owned subsidiary of a third (Copperweld
Corp.). When Regal's former general manager left and took steps to
enter into competition with Copperweld/Regal, Copperweld succeeded
in delaying his entry for nine months by issuing a threatening letter that
invoked Copperweld's rights under its purchase agreement. Somehow
a jury was persuaded that an agreement between Copperweld and Regal
violated the antitrust laws. The district court agreed, and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion" deliberately or inadvertently made
the case for certiorari. Academic commentary on the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine was "almost uniformly critical," it noted.' 2 The circuits had taken "various limiting approaches."' 13 The Seventh Circuit's
position, which was new and evolving, eschewed Supreme Court language and academic pronouncements, and rather looked to the extent of
separation infact between the parent and the wholly owned subsidiary.' 4
When the Solicitor General strongly urged the granting of certiorari
to resolve the disarray in the lower courts, 5 it would have bordered on
" 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982) (Cummings, Ch. J.).
12Id. at 316-17. Examples include Phillip Areeda, IntraenterpriseConspiracy Doctrine in
Decline, 97 HARV. L. REv. 451 (1983) (arguing that no "single economic unit" should be
capable of conspiracy, and discussing relevant factors); Milton Handler & Thomas A.
Smart, The PresentStatus of the IntracorporateConspiracyDoctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REv. 23 (1981)
(reviewing cases and calling for abandonment of intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine);
Lawrence C. McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section I of the Sherman
Act, 41 VA. L. REV. 183 (1955) (arguing against the doctrine); Everett 1. Willis & Robert
Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20 (1968)
(advocating limiting doctrine to where subsidiaries hold themselves out as competitors
and where subsidiaries are used specifically to harm competition); Note, Intra-Enterprise
Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MICH. L. REV. 717
(1977) (arguing against finding conspiracy where parent controls day-to-day operations
of subsidiaries).
"691 F.2d at 317-18.
'4 Id.

at 318 & 320.

"Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Copperweld,
available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File. The brief and the subsequent brief on
the writ of certiorari were also signed by the Federal Trade Commission's General Counsel.
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the irresponsible for the Court not to do so. In its opinion, the Court
claimed that it limited its "inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented:
whether a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1of the Sherman Act."1 6 In fact, however, the Court's

language and approach went beyond that.
The Solicitor General's amicus briefs were key to the Court's eventual
opinion. Copperweld's petition for certiorari set forth a straightforward
position: There is "disarray among the circuits"; Supreme Court clarification is needed; and there is a "principled and practical alternative to
the existing confusion." 7 The petition sought a narrow response to a
narrow question.
The Government's amicus brief, written principally by the Antitrust
Division,"s took a different approach. The heart of antitrust doctrine,
the brief argued, is the application of "more stringent legal standards
for multiparty conduct than for unilateral action."' 9 In words that would
reemerge,20 the brief contrasted Sherman Act Sections 1 and Section 2.
Under the latter, "there is no violation unless analysis of market structure
and conduct indicates the presence of at least a dangerous probability
of monopolization.",2' "The difficulty with the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine is that it evaluates conduct within a single competitive unit by
the stringent standard for conspiracy cases, simply on the basis of an
enterprise's choice of corporate form. 2
The Court also may have been influenced by an issue it declined to
address.2 3 In their petition, Copperweld and Regal Tube had proposed
'6 467 U.S. at 767.
17 Petition for Certiorari,

Copperweld, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
For its "practical alternative," petitioners urged the Court to hold that no agreement among
parents and wholly owned subsidiaries can violate Sherman Act § 1. "This rule would
recognize that, where there is a complete unity of legal and economic interests, a parent
and subsidiary should be viewed as a single enterprise." Petition.
1' The Government's brief on the writ of certiorari was signed by (among others) the
deputy solicitor general who argued the case and an assistant to the Solicitor General.
Neither name appeared on the brief on the petition. On that brief the Solicitor General
was joined only by Antitrust Division attorneys and the FTC's general counsel.
'9 DOJ Brief on Petition. The same distinction was highlighted in an article Professor
Areeda published in the December 1993 HarvardLaw Review, Areeda, supra note 12, at
454-56.
20 See infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
2 DOJ Brief on Petition (citations omitted).
22 Id.
21 Conceivably a third key was the absence of Justice White, who did not participate.
Had Justice White voted against the majority, as has been suggested would have been
likely, Wood Hutchinson, supra note 6, at 91 n.77, the vote would have been 5-4 and
Chief Justice Burger might have crafted his opinion a little more narrowly, out of fear of
losing the fifth vote. See Campbell, supra note 6, at 460 ("lopsided majorities leave room
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a second (of two) "questions presented," asking whether competitive
harm could be shown under the rule of reason "without analysis of
the structure of the relevant market and proof that defendants possess
sufficient market power to have an adverse effect on that market."24
Petitioners argued that it was undisputed that the affected market was
at all times highly competitive, and the lower courts had found a violation
without giving attention to "market realities., 25 Although petitioners'
claim was without merit, as the Solicitor General pointed out, 26 the Court
may have been troubled by the assertion.2 v
B.

THE COURT'S OPINION

The Court's Copperweld opinion closely followed the Solicitor General's
lead. The opinion's analysis began with the " 'basic distinction between
concerted and independent action' "-quoting Monsanto, which the
Court had issued in March, three and a half months after it heard
argument in Copperweld, and three months before it published the Copperweld opinion. 2" The Copperweld Court then explained, as had the Government, that it follows from this distinction that agreements involving
a corporation's unincorporated divisions and (usually) officers and employees cannot rise to the level of a Sherman Act conspiracy.2 9 The Court
extended the logic of this reasoning to wholly owned subsidiaries, using
colorful language not echoing any brief:
For similar reasons, the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for
to maneuver, to massage the statement of a rationale, to plant useful dicta for a later
case").
21 Petition for Certiorari. The first question, on which certiorari was granted,
asked,
"What is the proper legal standard for determining when a parent corporation is capable
of conspiring with its wholly-owned subsidiary in violation of the Sherman Act?" Id.
25

Id.

26

See DOJ Brief on Petition (petitioners' second question does not warrant review). The

Seventh Circuit had rejected an argument that competitive harm could be shown only by
an increased market share. 691 F.2d at 322. Increased market share is not the sine qua
non of competitive harm at least in a case challenging actions that delayed new entry into
a market, which is all the Seventh Circuit held, id. at 322-23 (and the Solicitor General
endorsed). Yet the district court had expressed a lack of enthusiasm for market share
evidence, and petitioners were able to claim that the market had always been competitive;
together, these facts gave petitioners a colorable basis for arguing that "this Court should
reject the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that, in rule of reason cases, it is unnecessary to
examine the structure of the relevant market or to assess whether defendants possess
sufficient market power to have an adverse impact on competition in that market." Petition
for Certiorari.
27 Copperweld and the role of market power is discussed infra at Part IlI.B.
'8 467 U.S. at 767 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
(1984)).
'9Id.at 769-771.
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purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one. They
are not unlike a multiple team [sic] of horses drawing a vehicle under
the control of a single driver. With or without a formal "agreement,"
the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder.
If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do "agree" to a course
of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had
previously served different interests, and there is no justification for
§ 1 scrutiny.3"

The Court pointed out that the competitive consequences of the actions
here at issue would have been the same whether they had occurred while
Regal was a corporate division or a corporate subsidiary.
Finally, the Court closed its opinion with ruminations on what the
dissent called the "gap" inantitrust law created by the decision, namely,
the potential that a firm not subject to Sherman Act Section 2 may be
able unilaterally to harm competition.3 ' The Court responded that any
such "gap" was probably sound policy and in any event was the creature
of Congress. "[T]he appropriate inquiry requires us to explain the logic
underlying Congress' decision to exempt unilateral conduct from § 1
scrutiny, and to assess whether that logic similarly excludes the conduct
of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. 32 The Court concluded by
noting that Clayton Act Section 7, Sherman Act Section 2, and FTC Act
Section 5 provide ample authority for preventing harm to competition.3 3
Eliminating the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine "will simply eliminate treble damages from private state tort suits masquerading as antitrust actions. 3"
'0Id. at 771.
" See id. at 789-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his article anticipating the Copperweld
decision, Professor Areeda had argued that there is no antitrust "lacuna" and, even if
there were, it would notjustify a broad intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. Areeda, supra
note 12, at 452-57.
" 467 U.S. at 776.
13Id. at 777 (any "enterprise is fully subject to § 2 of the Sherman Act and
§ 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act"); cf. DOJ Merits Brief, Copperweld, available in LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Briefs File ("Anticompetitive conduct by commonly owned and controlled
corporations would remain ftlly subject to antitrust enforcement under the standards
applicable to other unilateral conduct. Thus, it would be subject to Section 2 of the Sherman
Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in appropriate circumstances.");
id. ("Anticompetitive conduct by such enterprises would remain subject to Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.").
" 467 U.S. at 777; cf. Petition for Certiorari (arguing second issue, which the Court did
not accept) ("If state business tort law is not to be swallowed by the antitrust laws, and the
federal courts swollen with commercial grievances masquerading as antitrust claims, this
Court must insist that the lower courts demand ...a persuasive demonstration of injury
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II. POST-COPPERWELD SHERMAN ACT
CONSPIRACY DEVELOPMENTS
Lower courts have been called upon regularly to apply Copperweld to
claims of Sherman Act conspiracy. Some applications have represented
the predictable filling in of gaps in Copperweld's rule. Many decisions
have been challenging, however. Sometimes the issue has been easy to
pose but difficult to resolve; other times it has seemed that even the
question being asked has been elusive.
Some decisions required only modest extrapolation from the Copperweld opinion. Courts quickly extended Copperweld to Sherman Act
Section 2 conspiracies to monopolize. 5 Another obvious conclusion,
which courts quickly grasped, was that sister corporations are incapable
of conspiring in violation of the Sherman Act.3' Other progeny of Copperweld are more controversial.
A.

OWNERSHIP SHORT OF

100

PERCENT

Courts struggled with the question of how far to extend Copper-weld
beyond 100 percent ownership. In its 1988 International Guidelines, the
Antitrust Division adopted a majority-stockholding test, 37 but the Division
is replacing the 1988 Guidelines with Guidelines that do not address the
to competition, and not simply injury to a competitor.") (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)).
'5Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 149-50
(4th Cir. 1990); Potters Medical Ctr. v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 573-74 (6th Cir.
1986); Appraisers Coalition v. Appraisal Inst., 845 F. Supp. 592, 603 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Levi
Case Co. v. ATS Prods., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 428, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1992); H.R.M., Inc. v.
Tele-Communications, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 645 (D. Colo. 1987); Stepp v. Ford Motor Credit
Co.,
623 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
36
Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 145-46
(4th Cir. 1990) (subsidiary and subsidiary of different subsidiary cannot conspire; reviewing
cases); Directory Sales Management Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606 (6th Cir.
1987); Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984); D'Last Corp.
v. Ugent, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13450, at *17-18 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 1994) (reviewing cases);
Bell At. Business Sys. Servs. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(no conspiracy between 100%-owned subsidiary and 80%-owned subsidiary); Cohen v.
Primerica Corp., 709 F. Supp. 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 1993-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 70,282 (D. Minn. 1988); Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elecs.
(U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Carl Hizel & Sons, Inc. v. BrowningFerris Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1201, 1202 n.2 (D. Colo. 1984). The only misstep was
Ray Dobbins Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 604 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D. Va.
1984). Advanced Health-Care put the Fourth Circuit back on track.
37 Department ofJustice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
(1988), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109, at 20,630 (adding that for significant but less
than majority stockholdings, "the Department would make a factual inquiry to determine
whether the parent corporation actually had effective working control of the subsidiary").
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issue. 8 Courts have held uniformly that de minimis deviations from 100
percent do not prevent application of Copperweld 9 In particular cases
courts have applied Copperweld where parental stock ownership totaled
91.9 percent, 40 85 percent, 4' 82 percent, 42 80 percent, 43 and, in the extreme case, 51 percent. 4 Other courts, however, have found stockholdings of 54 percent, 4 75 percent, 46 and 79 percent47 to be insufficient to
invoke Copperweld.
In his Copperweld brief, the Solicitor General suggested that levels
of 50 percent to 100 percent stockholdings should create a rebuttable
presumption that the two entities are insufficiently independent to conspire.4 8 This continues to be an attractive suggestion, with the understanding 9that Copperweld should apply to stockholdings of virtually 100
4
percent.
38[Proposed] Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations 1994 (Oct.
13,39 1994), reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 338, Part 2 (Oct. 18, 1994).
E.g., Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(de minimis departure from 100% does not prevent complete parent-corporation control);
Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 395 (D. Del.) (de minimis
1% does not prevent application of Copperweld), modified inpart on other grounds, 643 F.
Supp. 449 (D. Del. 1986).
40 Leaco Enters., Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 737 F. Supp. 605 (D. Or. 1990) (unity of
purpose found based on 91.9% stock ownership where, under applicable Canadian law,
parent could compel subsidiary to merge).
4'Total Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Group Ins. Admin., Inc., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,148 (E.D. La.) (two corporations sharing the same president and director cannot
conspire where that individual owns 100% of the stock of one, 85% of the stock of the
other), amended on other grounds, 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,223 (E.D. La. 1993).
42 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Time Inc., 785 F. Supp. 371, 374, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing
claim alleging an agreement between a subsidiary and a parent that owned 82% of the
stock and controlled 93% of the voting power).
Rosen v. Hyundai Group (Korea), 829 F. Supp. 41, 45 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (complete
unity of interest shown where corporation owned 80% of subsidiary's stock, with the other
20% owned by one of the parent's managing directors), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Rosen
v. Samick, 22 F.3d 1091 (2d Cir. 1994).
4' Novatel Communications, Inc. v. Cellular Tel. Supply, Inc., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,412 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (51% stock ownership sufficient).
American Vision Ctrs., Inc. v. Cohen, 711 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (54% stockholding insufficient for Copperweld).
46 Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477 (D. Or. 1987) (75%
insufficient; only de minimis departures from 100% permitted).
17 Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1495 n.20 (3d Cir. 1985) (Copperweld
did not apply where parent corporation owned all voting stock and 79% of equity stock),
vacated, 475 U.S. 1105 (1986), order reentered and opinion largely readopted, 823 F.2d 49 (3d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060 (1988).
sDOJ Merits Brief.
4 See also AREEDA, supra note 6, ch. 14E-2; Stewart, supra note 6. A contrary view was
espoused without much discussion in Wood Hutchinson, supra note 6, at 96 ("logic of
13

15
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Copperweld colorfully depicted a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary
as "not unlike a multiple team [sic] of horses drawing a vehicle under
the control of a single driver." 50 Corporate law makes clear, however,
that when reins are shared no driver can steer without regard for other
drivers." The possible overinclusiveness of a bright line rule is particularly apparent in an age of increasingly complex corporate inter-relationships. U.S. firms can acquire 49 percent interests in foreignjoint ventures
yet may have more practical control-through contractual provisions and
bargaining leverage-than majority shareholders. Foreign firms establish
U.S. joint ventures in which control may not be based on majority stock
positions.12 "Parent" corporations with majority equity positions may
have less power than entities with commanding ownership of debt or
convertible securities.5" Ownership of a special class of stock, or supramajority voting protection, may confer power. It is too great a stretch
to conclude that Sherman Act issues will never arise in horizontal or
vertical agreements between two firms when one has a majority equity
position in the other.
Although it might be possible to rule that majority stock ownership
suffices to invoke Copperweld except in an indicated series of situations,
it is simpler and probably more prudent to use a rebuttable presumption.
Courts are always free, moreover, to consider preexisting stock ownership when evaluating an agreement's effect on competition.5 4
Copperweld" calls for finding no § 1 conspiracy wherever majority ownership, because there
would be "no destruction of competition that was otherwise in the market"); cf. Baxter,
supra note 6, at 425 ("[M]y own guess is that the Supreme Court will come eventually to
a 50.0001 percent bright line test .... But that is just a guess.").
50 467 U.S. at 771.
51See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 7.8 (1986) (discussing legal obligation of parent to share corporate opportunities with partially owned subsidiary).
51 Cf. 31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (1994) (regulations implementing
Exon-Florio Amendment
to the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 2170) ("control" defined to include
any power, "whether or not ...exercisable through the ownership of a majority or a
dominant minority of the total outstanding voting securities . . . , or by proxy voting,
contractual arrangements or other means, to determine, direct or decide matters affecting
an entity").
5' In Aerotech, Inc. v. TCW Capital, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70,616 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
20, 1994), Copperweld was held to apply when one corporation controlled another through
debt rather than equity (and presumably the equity holders could not have shown control).
Had this been a case involving subtle control through the pressure that debt holders can
assert when a firm finds itself in financial straits, Aerotech might have posed difficult issues.
It was not such a case. Instead, one firm provided the financing for a leveraged buyout
of another, and, according to the plaintiff's complaint "'totally control[led] the operations"'
of the bought-out firm. Id. at 72,35 1. Conceded total control has alwaysjustified a conclusion
that conspiracy is impossible.
5' See AREEDA, supra note 6,
1469.
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COMMON OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

In Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production Specialties, Inc.,55 the Fifth Circuit
extended Copperweld to situations with common control. The court held
that two corporations cannot conspire in violation of the Sherman Act
when three individuals own, respectively, 30 percent, 30 percent, and
40 percent of each corporation:
Given Copperweld, we see no relevant difference between a corporation
wholly owned by another corporation, two corporations wholly owned
by a third corporation or two corporations wholly owned by three persons who together manage all affairs of the two corporations. A contract
between them does not join formerly distinct economic units. 6
Century Tool made the resolution of common control cases seem selfevident, and courts have followed the Fifth Circuit's lead.57 On the other
hand, in Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz55 the Seventh Circuit refused to extend
5
the common ownership cases beyond identical ownership situations. 1
Cases involving common control often also feature influence through
personal relationships and service as an officer and director. Thus, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that two corporations were incapable of conspiring where an individual served as president of both
corporations, owned half of the shares of each corporation, and had a
brother who owned the other shares.6" And where one person effectively
controlled two corporations and the same shareholders owned the stock,
a court ruled out Sherman Act conspiracy without discussing whether
the percentage ownership interests were identical.61
C. OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, AND CONTRACTING PARTIES

Even before Copperweld the courts generally recognized that a corporation's agreements with its officers and employees were not subject to
Sherman Act review. Copperweldacknowledged this and noted that "many
55737 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J.).
6
5 1d. at 1317.
5'See Guzowski v. Hartman, 969 F.2d 211, 213-14 (6th Cir. 1992) (racetrack corporations
with the same two shareholders not capable of conspiring), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 978
(1993); Shaw v. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 674, 677-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(dismissing complaint alleging that two firms were under common ownership and control).
5'807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
5
9 Judge Easterbrook in dissent argued that the owner (with his son) of one corporation
effectively controlled the other, but the court majority concluded that "there is no indication
that [this owner] controlled or could control [the second corporation] independent of the
wishes of his co-investors." Id. at 542 n.19.
60 Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1378, 1385 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
6'Gucci v. Gucci Shops, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (the same shareholders
owned Gucci and Gucci Shops, and Maurizio Gucci effectively controlled both companies).
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courts have created an exception for corporate officers acting on their
own behalf., 62 Agreements among officers and employees continue generally to escape Sherman Act Section 1,63 and most courts extend the
protection to corporate agents.64
Much litigation has involved the exception noted by Copperweld for
agents "acting on their own behalf." The Eighth Circuit in Pink Supply
Corp. v. Hiebert,Inc.65 captured this rule: "When the interests of principal
and agents diverge, and the agents at the time of the conspiracy are
acting beyond the scope of their authority or for their own benefit rather
than that of the principal, they may be legally capable of engaging in
an antitrust conspiracy with their corporate principal."66 Other circuits
have recognized a similar exception, 6v although the Sixth Circuit has
declined. Except for litigation over whether a hospital and its medical
staff are capable of conspiring, which is a specialized question still needing resolution, 69 even inthose circuits recognizing a personal stake excep62 467

U.S. at 769-71 & n.15.

63E.g., Guzowski v. Hartman, 969 F.2d 211,

213-14 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.

Ct. 978 (1993).
6 Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987) (while acting as sales
agent, firm not capable of conspiring with principal); Lifeline Ltd. No. II v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 821 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (E.D. Mich.), modified, 821 F. Supp. 1213 (E.D.
Mich. 1993); Sample, Inc. v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 498, 502 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (manufacturer and sales representatives cannot conspire); cf. James M. King &
Assocs. v. G.D.Van Wagenen Co., 717 F. Supp. 667,674 (D. Minn. 1989) (denying summary
judgment where nature of business relationship insufficiently clear). But cf Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1986) (dictum) (collaboration among travel agents orchestrated by an airline is not protected by Copperweld since
the agents and the airline are not a single entity).
65 788 F.2d 1313, 1317 (8th Cir. 1986).
6 Id. at 1317 (citation omitted) (exemption did not apply) (distinguishing ongoing principal-agent relations from the situation in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968),
where two separate firms came together to lessen competition).
67 See St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(giving leave to amend complaint to allege that hospital management corporation had an
independent personal stake in conspiracy with the hospital that employed it); Tunis Bros.
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1486 (3d Cir. 1985) ("If corporate officers or
employees act for their own interests, and outside the interests of the corporation, they
are legally capable of conspiring with their employers for purposes of section I.")
(citations
omitted), vacated, 475 U.S. 1105 (1986), order reentered and opinion largely readopted, 823
F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060 (1988).
"8Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 615 (6th Cir. 1990) (declining to
adopt independent personal stake exception), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); cf. Potters
Medical Ctr. v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1986) (any such exception would
require an independent personal stake in lessening competition).
69 See, e.g., Willman v. Heartland Hosp. East, 34 F.3d 605, 610 (8th Cir. 1994) (reviewing

split in circuits); Page I. Austin, Application of the Intracorporate Inmunity Doctrine in Hospital
Peer Review Cases, ANTITRUST, Spring 1992, at 40 (reviewing cases).
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tion plaintiffs rarely manage to prove a conspiracy in these cases. 7°
Two district court cases in the Ninth Circuit-one affirmed per curiam
in a brief opinion-ruled that contractual relationships precluded a Sherman Act conspiracy. One seemed to say that franchisors and franchisees
cannot conspire for Sherman Act purposes; another that a patent holder
and patentee cannot. Neither opinion is convincing.
The first case, Williams v. I.B. FischerNevada,7 involved a challenge to
a franchise agreement's "no-switching" clause, which prevented oneJackin-the-Box restaurant franchisee from hiring another franchisee's managers without permission. Without mentioning Copperweld, and relying
on pre-CopperweldNinth Circuit cases, the district court granted summary
judgment against a former manager. The court began by noting that "the
cornerstone of the Ninth Circuit analysis for a § 1 violation-competition
between entities-does not exist in this case., 72 The court then emphasized the franchisor and franchisee's "common economic goals" and the
franchisor's "complete control over all of the decision[s] effecting [sic]
the operation of the restaurant., 73 The court of appeals explained briefly
that it agreed with the district court's result. It said that the defendants
were incapable of conspiring because they were a " 'common enterprise.'
The second case, Levi Case Co. v. ATS Products, Inc.,7 5 addressed an
accusation that one Lawrence Shea and a corporation he formed, ATS
70

See, e.g., Ripplemeyer v. National Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Ark.

1992) (summary judgment granted); Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,282 (D. Minn. 1988) (employee did not act in her own interest); E.T. Barwick Indus.,
Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 692 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (officer had same
interests as corporation). But cf. C & W Construction Co. v. Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of Am., 687 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Haw. 1988) (declining to dismiss suit against
union agents, who could be individually liable in antitrust). See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1993 SUPPLEMENT TO ANTITRUST LAW 1471'e (only certain
independent employee interests relevant).
A recent case limited the kinds of personal interests that would satisfy the exception.
Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Pa. 1994). While the
employees in Siegel Transfer may have had personal interests distinct from those of the
corporate defendant (Carrier Express), "plaintiffs have alleged no interest on their part
in competition with CarrierExpress. It is the joining together of formerly competitive interests
which implicates the antitrust laws." Id. at 999 (citations omitted).
7"794 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Nev. 1992), aff'd per curiam, 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993).
72
1d. at 1031.
73 Id. at 1031-32; see also id. at 1032 ("The emphasis is properly placed upon the commonality of interest of the corporations and the degree of control exercised by the dominant
corporation.").
71 999 F.2d at 447 (quoting Thomsen v. Western Elec. Co., 680 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982)).
75 788 F. Supp. 428 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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Products, engaged in an antitrust conspiracy to lessen competition in
ductwork produced using patents obtained by Mr. Shea and exclusively
licensed, initially, to ATS. The court found an incapability of conspiring
while Mr. Shea was an officer and majority shareholder of ATS. This
result may well have been correct. But the court also found conspiracy
impossible after Mr. Shea sold ATS to another corporation, ended his
relations with ATS, changed the exclusive license (except for an existing
sublicense to the plaintiff) to the new firm (which gave a sublicense to
its subsidiary ATS), and promised not to compete in that business. The
court reasoned that Mr. Shea and ATS were not " 'independent sources
of economic power previously pursuing separate interests' ,16 because
the exclusive license prevented Mr. Shea from competing. Since they
could not compete, they could not conspire, according to the court.
There are a number of weaknesses in both courts' analyses. Williams
reasoned, from the extensive control embodied in a franchise agreement,
that the agreement itself was not a Sherman Act conspiracy. The bootstrapping nature of this reasoning is evident. Levi Case misunderstood
that an inventor's grant of an exclusive license under a patent does not
prevent him from competing; it just prevents him from competing with
the aid of that patented technology. He may be capable of competing
without it.
More fundamentally, both courts came too close to concluding that
only competitors can conspire.77 Williams emphasized that franchisees
compete neither with each other nor with their franchisor.7" Although
Levi Case said that Mr. Shea could not compete, it noted that he always
had the right "to approve sublicenses. ' This right gave him an independent role and differentiated him from ATS. 80
76 Id. at 432 (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d

268, 274-75 (8th Cir. 1988), which is discussed infra text at note 86).
" For an ambitious attempt to read Copperweld as limiting the Sherman Act to horizontal
agreements, see Clark, supra note 6, at 1177-78. Clark sought support for the idea in the
Court's explanation of why Congress treated concerted behavior relatively harshly: "In
any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately
are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse
directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving
in one particular direction." 467 U.S. at 769 (emphasis added); see infra text at note 105.
Clark argued that since only a horizontal cartel can increase economic power, nothing else
is an agreement for purpose of Section 1.
78 794 F. Supp. at 1031.
7"788 F. Supp. at 431.
80 One oddity is that the new firm was named neither as a defendant nor as a coconspirator. If nothing else, the agreements while ATS was being sold, the patent rights
were being rearranged, and Mr. Shea was promising not to compete would seem susceptible
to Sherman Act review.
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Copperweld discussed the potential harm from agreements that deprive
the market of "independent centers of decisionmaking.""' Unless the
opinion is to be read as ending sub silentio Sherman Act scrutiny of
tying, exclusive dealing, franchisor-franchisee pricing, and other vertical
restraints, Copperweld cannot limit Sherman Act coverage to agreements
among competitors. A court should be cautious about concluding that
a franchisor and franchisee, or a patent holder and a sublicensee, are
legally incapable of conspiring.
D.

JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER HORIZONTAL RELATIONSHIPS

Copperweld issues also have arisen repeatedly in joint venture cases.
(Copperweld's most publicly celebrated role has been in sports litigation,
where defense lawyers have argued futilely that it protects league activities. 2 ) The leading Copperweldjoint venture case continues to be Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.8" In Rothery, a group of shippers
had formed Atlas Van Lines. The Atlas board of directors was comprised
of actual and potential competitors. When the board adopted an allegedly
anticompetitive policy prohibiting carrier agents from operating on their
own account, the district court thought the decision was protected by

Copperweld. The court of appeals disagreed firmly (although finding for
Atlas on other grounds), because the venture and the board were made
up of actual or potential competitors.8 4
Subsequent cases have largely followed Rothery's lead. Although many
joint venture issues remain to be resolved, courts have been reluctant
thus far to let joint ventures robe themselves in Copperweld's cloak of
protection from Sherman Act scrutiny.85
"' 467

U.S. at 769.

82 See Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994) (NFL not a single entity; since

NFL teams compete in various ways, there are diverse, not united, interests); Chicago
Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (treating NBA
as a joint venture rather than a single entity), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992); McNeil
v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 880 (D. Minn. 1992) (NFL not a single entity). The antitrust
treatment of sports leagues has been fertile ground for scholars. See, e.g., Lee Goldman,
Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REv. 751 (1989); Myron C. Grauer,
The Use and Misuse of the Term "Consumer Welfare": Once More to the Mat on the Issue of Single
Entity Statsfor Sports Leagues Under Section I of the Sherman Act, 64 TUL. L. REV. 71 (1989);
Gary R. Roberts, The Antitrust Status of Sports Leagues Revisited, 64 TUL. L. REV. 117 (1989).
" 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
84
1d. at 214-15.
i5 See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605,615-16 (6th Cir. 1990) (reversing
district court; nonprofit physician mutual insurance company need not be viewed as single
entity where physicians allegedly conspired to use insurance company to lessen physician
competition), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v.
Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 144 n.7 (4th Cir. 1990) (After noting Copperweld's
teachings about intra-enterprise conspiracies, the court continued: "Because joint ventures
consist of multiple entities, they are legally capable of violating § 1.") (citing NCAA); Appraisers Coalition v. Appraisal Inst., 845 F. Supp. 592, 604 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (trade associa-
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The leading case finding what could be considered a joint venture to
be a single entity is City of Mt. Pleasant,Iowa v. Associated Electric Cooperative,
Inc.s6 Less than a year after the Supreme Court decided Copperweld, the
Mount Pleasant district court granted summary judgment in favor of a
rural electric cooperative charged by some cities with engaging in price
discrimination, a price-squeeze conspiracy, and monopolization. 7 The
district court held that the cooperative and its constituent cooperatives
were a single entity. This entity had three tiers: consumer-nenbers
owned forty-three electricity retail-distribution cooperatives; these fortythree cooperatives owned six generation and transmission cooperatives;
and these six cooperatives owned Associated Electric, a "super" generation and transmission cooperative responsible for supplying power to
the six. The court ruled that any agreement among these cooperatives
about the price at which to wholesale electricity to the cities was not
subject to Sherman Act Section 1. Relying heavily on Copperweld, the
court declared the cooperatives a "single entity" because the system "does
not join separate economic actors who previously sought different
goals." '
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court's analysis
and affirmed the judgment. 9 The court relied heavily on Copperweld's
discussion of corporate divisions. 90 Without significant factual analysis
tions and their members, who were competitors, capable of conspiring); Mastercard Int'l,
Inc. v. Dean Witter, 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Coppenveld does
not protect MasterCard association from antitrust scrutiny); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 975 n.19 (D. Utah 1993) (Copperweld does not protect restrictions
a joint venture imposes upon its members), rev'd on other grounds, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir.
1994); Spence v. Southeastern Alaska Pilots' Ass'n, 789 F. Supp. 1014, 1021-22 (D. Alaska
1992) (refusing to grant summary judgment for trade association and its members). But
cf. Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Nev. 1992), aff'd per curiam, 999
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) (" 'common enterprise' " test) (discussed supra text at notes 7174); Hudson's Bay Co. Fur Sales Inc. v. American Legend Coop., 651 F. Supp. 819 (D.N.J.
1986) (no conspiracy when fur-grower cooperative's board, comprised of competitors,
agreed to restrict availability of trademark, since all had common interests).
A helpful insight but not the last word is provided by Professor Areeda's distinction
between a trade association functioning as a single entity engaged in ordinary business
and a trade association functioning as a group of competitors making decisions affecting
competition and their roles as competitors. AREEDA, supra note 6, at 348.
" 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Proctor v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 651 F. Supp. 1505 (N.D. 11. 1986) (Copperweld extended to the unincorporated
church associations that had a unity of interest as part of a centralized unified church;
plaintiff's argument that the church had a republican form of government, with its constituent parts capable of conspiring, was rejected).
87City of Fulton, Mo. v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 1985 WL 126 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 8,
1985).
88 1985 WL 126, at *3.
'9 838 F.2d at 271.
90 467 U.S. at 770-7 1:
A division within a corporate structure pursues the common interests of the whole
rather than interests separate from those of the corporation itself; ... Because
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the Eighth Circuit concluded that "the cooperative organization is a single
enterprise pursuing a common goal." 91 The court said it followed from
this conclusion that the plaintiffs could avoid summary judgment only
by showing that some defendants had
pursued interests diverse from those of the cooperative itself. By "diverse" we mean interests which tend to show that any two of the defendants are, or have been, actual or potential competitors, or, at the very
least, interests which are sufficiently divergent so that a reasonable juror
could conclude that the entities have not always worked together for a
common cause. In the language of Copperweld, the City must show facts
that could lead a reasonable juror to find the coordination between any
two defendants to be a 'joining of two independent sources of economic
power previously pursuing separate interests.' 92
The court stressed that none of the constituent cooperatives were "independent sources" of power. 93 Occasional disputes about service areas did
not alter the nature of this interdependent, single enterprise.94
City of Mt. Pleasant is unlike the typical joint venture case. Unhappy
wholesale customers accused an ongoing, multitier cooperative system
of improper pricing. No defendant preexisted the cooperative system.
Since the defendants functioned exclusively inside the cooperative system, realistically they were neither competitors nor potential competitors
(which, as the court noted, 9 distinguished the case from Rothery Storage).
Pricing by the cooperative system could not affect competition differently
from pricing by a more conventional single firm; common pricing did not
entail surrender of independent decisionmaking but was the inevitable
consequence of the cooperative system. Accordingly, it made little sense
to subject pricing by the cooperative system to special antitrust scrutiny.99
coordination between a corporation and its division does not represent a sudden
joining of two independent sources of economic power previously pursuing separate interests, it is not an activity that warrants § 1 scrutiny.
quoted in part at 838 F.2d at 274.
9' 838 F.2d at 276.
912Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 277 (emphasis by the court).
9 Mt. Pleasant found substantial support for its conclusion in Copperweld's apparent
endorsement of Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S.
19 (1962), see Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 773 (two agricultural cooperatives and the subsidiary
of one of them were found to be a single organization even though the membership of
one cooperative was a subset of membership of the first). 838 F.2d at 275 (also finding
support in United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975)).
95838 F.2d at 276.
96 City of Mt. Pleasant is more obviously correct than a rural electric cooperative decision
that relied on the Mt. Pleasant district court opinion, Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia
Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1986). In Greensboro, 39 preexisting rural electric
membership cooperatives (EMCs) formed Oglethorpe Power Corporation, a not-for-profit
electric generation and transmission cooperative. Oglethorpe "was organized to supply
the electric power needs of its 39 members through the generation, wholesale sale, wholesale
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The Eighth Circuit went one step beyond City of Mt. Pleasantin International Travel Arrangers v. NWA Inc.,9' when it approved a jury's finding
that two otherwise unrelated firms became incapable of Sherman Act
conspiracy by agreeing in principle to merge. International Travel Arrangers presented an unusual situation. A tour operator alleged, as a
small part of what was principally a monopolization suit, that Minneapolis's largest airline and largest tour operator had conspired to harm the
smaller tour operator. The district court instructed the jury to decide
whether the two defendants were capable of conspiring during the period
between their decision to merge and their actual merger; and the jury
found for the defense. The instruction asked whether the two firms
"possess[ed] an inherent unity of economic interest and purpose," and
whether the firms "lacked independent economic consciousness after
they had decided to merge." An affirmative answer to either question
called for a defense verdict on the Section 1 charge. 9 The Eighth Circuit
said this was a proper instruction.
purchase, and transmission of electricity... .[T]he EMCs entered into a series of 'wholesale
power sales contracts' under which the EMCs purchase most of their energy needs from
Oglethorpe." Id. at 1352-53. "These contracts, which extend through the year 2022,
obligate each EMC to buy all of its power and energy requirements from Oglethorpe"
(with an unimportant exception). Id. at 1362.
A company seeking to sell power to an EMC claimed that those supply agreements
between Oglethorpe and the various EMCs violated the Sherman Act. Without much
analysis the Northern District of Georgia granted a defense motion for summary judgment
on this issue because it concluded that Oglethorpe and the EMCs were a single entity:
[Tihis Court considers Oglethorpe and the EMCs to be, in economic substance,
an integrated unitary business enterprise. Oglethorpe is, in essence, a whollyowned subsidiary of its collective members which was created for the purpose of
providing them with their power supply needs. As such, Oglethorpe and its
members are legally incapable of concerted action in violation of the antitrust
laws. See City of Fulton, Missouri v. Associated Electric....
Id. at 1367 (In an omitted footnote the court stated that Oglethorpe was too permanent
and integral to be fairly characterized as a joint venture.).
In fact, however, Greensboro differed significantly from City of FultonlMt. Pleasant. The
latter case involved a challenge to pricing by a prior-existing cooperative. Greensboro addressed the terms under which a group of formerly independent EMCs came together
and agreed not to purchase power from firms such as the plaintiff. Before this agreement
the EMCs must have been competitors or at least potential competitors in the purchase
of power; the lawsuit challenged the ending of that competition.
9'991 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 345 (1993). InternationalTravelArrangers,
the responses of enforcement officials, and implications for merging parties are discussed
in William Blumenthal, The Scope of PermissibleCoordination Between Merging Entities Prior

to Consummation, 63

ANTITRUST

L.J. 1 (1994).

9 The instruction was as follows:
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits only those unreasonable restraints of
trade which are affected [sic] by a contract, combination or conspiracy between
separate entities. The economic substance of the relationship between two entities
determines whether they are "separate" for purposes of a section 1 conspiracy.
Where the entities possess an inherent unity of economic interest and purpose,
they are not separate entities capable of conspiring. Thus, if you find that [the
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International Travel Arrangers is an unfortunate decision for several
reasons. Asking a jury to speculate about the "economic consciousness"
of a corporation seems unlikely to focus the jury's attention on anything
important to a sound decision. The instructions have a specific substantive
flaw as well. They declare that there can be no conspiracy when two
entities have "an inherent unity of economic interest and purpose." Yet
when two firms achieve "unity of economic interest," the law declares
that they have conspired. The International Travel Arrangers instruction
seemingly teaches that when defendants have agreed with specificity to
harm consumers, raise prices, drive out competition, and share equally
in the returns, the defendants can be found incapable of conspiring! It
is asking too much to expect an unassisted jury to distinguish between
mere "unity" (which establishes agreement) and "inherent unity" (which
makes agreement impossible). Although the jury instruction finds support in Copperweld's language,99 the instruction invites mischief.
The likely effect of InternationalTravel Arrangers on premerger corporate planning and procedures also is troubling.'0 0 Before that decision,
merging firms knew they were subject to Sherman Act Section 1 at least
potentially until the date of the merger. Now there is added uncertainty.
Even if InternationalTravelArrangersis good law in the jurisdiction where
a plaintiff might choose to file suit, merging firms do not know whether
protection from a conspiracy charge starts with an initial conversation,
a letter of intent, or an agreement in principle. For that matter, any
counselor must fear the deal that turns sour. A jury would seem unlikely
to conclude that two firms that drifted apart had "lacked independent
economic consciousness." But by the time of the schism the parties may
be in an antitrust violation. Copperweld's is a bright line rule based on
ownership and probably should not apply until ownership is final. If
two firms that enter into a challenged agreement formerly had competed
with little vigor, for whatever reason, this may'0 ' or may not 0 2 lessen the
defendant firms] lacked independent economic consciousness after they had decided to merge and before the merger was completed, they were not capable of
conspiring together at that time.
991 F.2d at 1397.
" Copperweld likely was the source of this error. It incorporated American Tobacco's test
for finding a Sherman Act agreement into its explanation of why parents and wholly
owned subsidiaries should be incapable of Sherman Act conspiracy: "In reality a parent
and a wholly owned subsidiary always have a 'unity of purpose or a common design.'"
467 U.S. at 771 (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)).
Thoughtful readers should have realized that American Tobacco's test for finding conspiracy
should not double as the test for finding conspiracy impossible.
"oo See also Blumenthal, supra note 97.
' See supra note 54.
012For instance, the Sherman Act likely would condemn an agreement by two significant
firms to continue forever refraining from crossing the Mississippi River and competing
with each other.
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anticompetitive effect of the agreement, but it is not reason to say there
is no agreement." 3
III. NONCONSPIRACY SHERMAN ACT APPLICATIONS
OF COPPERWELD
Although Copperweld addressed a narrow intra-enterprise conspiracy
question, Chief Justice Burger wrote a rather vigorous, wide-ranging
opinion, drawing significantly on the Solicitor General's briefs. Many
courts have applied Copperweld's language and analysis and applied them
to Sherman Act issues not involving conspiracy. Examples include (a)
the need for special concern about concerted action; (b) market power's
role in the rule of reason; and, especially, (c) the need for caution in
applying Sherman Act Section 2.
A.

CONCERN ABOUT CONCERTED ACTION

The Copperweld Court grounded its analysis-as had the Solicitor General-on the " 'basic distinction between concerted and independent
action.' ,,104 Copperweld forcefully warned of the risks associated with the
former:
Concerted activity subject to § I is judged more sternly than unilateral
activity under § 2. . . . [I]t is not necessary to prove that concerted activity

threatens monopolization.
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than
unilateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity is fraught
with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent
centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In

any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own
interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit.
This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power
is aimed but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one
particular direction. Of course, such mergings of resources may well
lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive
potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient
monopoly.' 5
103

International Travel Arrangers may have been led astray by language in Pink Supply

Corp. Pink Supply recognized that a principal and an agent, although normally treated as
a single entity, may be capable of conspiring when their interests diverge. See supra text
at note 66. InternationalTravel Arrangers concluded that the defendants in its case had nondivergent interests. But Pink Supply involved a narrow exception to a general rule applicable
to a corporation and its sales representatives, who are naturally closely aligned. Parties to
a merger, in contrast, are expected to guard their own interests right up to the end.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in City of Mt,Pleasanthad looked to whether the constituent
cooperatives had had "diverse interests," by which it meant (among other things) the
interests of actual or potential competitors. 838 F.2d at 276. This would seem applicable
to the situation in InternationalTravel Arrangers. The International Travel Arrangers court
merely said it was not. 991 F.2d at 1398.
'0'467 U.S. at 767 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761).
'0 Id. at 768-69 (emphasis added).
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Much of this language echoes the Solicitor General's1 0 6 and, to a lesser
extent, petitioners' briefs. 0 7
Few majority opinions have relied upon this insistence that concerted
actions are "fraught with anticompetitive risk." The notable exception
is Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co.'0° In reversing a lower court
grant of summary judgment, the Alvord-Polk court opened its opinion
with an explanation of why agreement is at the heart of antitrust, and
quoted most of the above language from Copperweld.,"9
Justices and other judges, as well, have quoted the same language in
dictum, dissents, and a vacated opinion. Justice Stevens quoted at length
from this part of Copperweld in his dissent in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co.," 0 prefacing the quotation with the lament that "[u]ntil
today, the Court has clearly understood why § 1 fundamentally differs
'0

DOJ Merits Brief

(Combinations of otherwise independent economic entities are properly subject
to stricter scrutiny .... [AIll combinations among otherwise independent economic
entities reduce to some extent the number of independent decision makers, thus
raising sufficient anticompetitive potential to merit careful scrutiny of their effects
on competition. In a system designed to foster multiple independent sources of
economic decision making, there is little reason to tolerate concerted business
conduct among rivals unless it involves an integration of resources under common
control or contractual sharing of functions that holds out the possibility of increased output, lower prices, or other procompetitive benefits that cannot be
attained by individual firms.)
(omitting footnote comparing common law to "Congress's determination to impose a more
stringent Sherman Act standard on concerted conduct ....); id. ("Concerted conduct
merits more careful scrutiny because it always reduces the number of independent economic decision makers."); id. (a "conscious agreement between commonly owned and
controlled units ...would not have any competitive significance, because it does not
eliminate previously independent centers of decision making"); see also DOJ Brief on
Petition ("Under the scheme of antitrust enforcement created by the Sherman Act, Congress has sought to foster independent economic decision making by establishing more
stringent legal standards for multiparty conduct than for unilateral action.") (footnote
omitted).
117Brief of Petitioners, Copperweld, available inLEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File ("The
dichotomy between the reach of Sections 1 and 2 reflects Congress's policy decision to
encourage vigorous competition among separate economic entities by imposing a stricter
standard of liability on concerted conduct."); id. ("Since Section 1 is concerned with collaborative practices in which economic resources under one source of legal control are joined
with those of another, its stringent standards ... should not be construed to apply where
the 'conspirators' are part of a single entity.").
" 37 F.3d 996 (3d Cir. 1994).
'09
Id. at 999-1000. Another example is Hess v. Inland Asphalt Co., 1990-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 68,954 (E.D. Wash. 1990), where the court denied summary judgment in a
horizontal refusal to deal case. Citing this part of Coppeweld, the court wrote that "[c]oncerted activity between separate entities is precisely the type of activity prohibited under
section 1 and, under the law, is judged more sternly than unilateral activity under section
2." Id. at 63,114.
"0 495 U.S. 328, 346 (1990) (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
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On remand in that case, Judge Reinfrom other antitrust violations.'
hardt's dissent also relied on this special concern about concerted action."' 2 The Eleventh Circuit's controversial (and subsequently vacated)
decision in Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hospital"3 featured
this Copperweld language," 4 and, in dictum in H.J., Inc. v. International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp.," 5 the Eighth Circuit wrote as follows:
Under Section 1, there is no need to prove that concerted activity
threatens monopolization; concerted behavior is treated more strictly
than unilateral behavior because the former "is fraught with anticompetitive risk." Thus, the inquiry in Section 1 cases ... does not focus
upon the definition of the relevant market which may be subject to
monopolization, but upon the threat of "anticompetitive effects" resulting from concerted activity.' 6
B.

MARKET POWER AND THE RULE OF REASON

While Copperweld emphasized the dangers of concerted action, by
clearly inserting a market power requirement into the rule of reason
calculus it also strengthened the litigation posture of firms accused of
certain concerted action. (Through their second question for review,
petitioners had highlighted the possibility that a firm without market
power might be at risk under the rule of reason." 7 ) The Court enhanced
the role of market power through two brief sentences that are part of
. Id. at 358 n. 17. The majority showed more reluctance in finding competitor antitrust
injury based on vertical price restraints.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, had dissented in Copperweld.
He had argued in part that the "trusts" from which antitrust got its name had consisted
of combinations of affiliated corporations. "The anomaly in today's holding is that the
corporate devices most similar to the original 'trusts' are now those which free an enterprise
from antitrust scrutiny." 467 U.S. at 788.
"2 USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 13 F.3d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Reinhardt,J., dissenting). Judge Reinhardt would have been more aggressive in extending
the Sherman Act to reach conspiracies to predate. The majority concluded that the plaintiff
had lost its chance to advance an alternative theory. Judge Nelson had made points similar
to judge Reinhardt's in an earlier majority opinion by the Ninth Circuit, 972 F.2d 1070,
1074 (9th Cir. 1992) (2-1, with Judge Alarcon dissenting), but the Ninth Circuit vacated
that opinion and issued its new, post-Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993), opinion, 2-1, with Judge Reinhardt dissenting.
" 919 F.2d 1550 (1 1th Cir. 1990), vacated and rehearing en banc granted, 979 F.2d 806
(1 th Cir. 1992), order granting en banc review vacated and panel ordered to dismiss the appeal,
vacate the originaljudgment, and order dismissal of the case, 9 F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1993) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2132 (1994).
"' Id. at 1562 ("Heightened scrutiny isjustified in the instant case since we are confronted
with a conspiracy.").
"5 867 F.2d 1531 (8th Cir. 1989).
116 Id. at 1543-44 (quoting Copperweld) (but finding no Monsanto-sufficient evidence of
conspiracy to support jury verdict).
"' See supra text at notes 24-26.
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a paragraph reviewing Sherman Act Section 1 (and contrasting it with
Section 2). After noting that certain action is per se illegal, the Court
continued:
Other combinations, such as mergers,joint ventures, and various vertical
agreements, hold the promise of increasing a firm's efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively. Accordingly, such combinations
arejudged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and market
structure designed to assess the combination's actual effect.' 1s
'9
The language echoed that in the Solicitor General's brief.

While some lower courts had declared previously that a market power
inquiry is essential to the rule of reason, 20 this was the first such declaration by the Supreme Court.' 2 ' Without resolving the ultimate role of a
market power analysis, 122 Copperweld provided important support to the
argument that market power should be a near-ubiquitous screen in antitrust. 123 Although other cases support the proposition, courts continue
to cite Copperweld regularly on the role of market power in rule of reason
cases. 12 4 The Seventh Circuit has also cited this part of Copperweld for
"' 467 U.S. at 768 (emphasis added) (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977), and Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)).
"9 See DOJ Merits Brief ("Concerted conduct that involves, for example, the creation
or transfer of productive units (e.g., a merger) is judged according to the 'rule of reason,'
under which courts examine market power and market structure to determine whether
the adverse effects of a combination are unlikely to outweigh its benefits."); id. ("Combinations that may increase efficiency ... (e.g., mergers, joint ventures and various types of
vertical agreements) are judged under the 'rule of reason,' under which courts consider
the market power of the firms involved and the structure of the relevant markets in
determining whether the net effect of the combination is anticompetitive or procompetitive.").
120 Stephen Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and Access (Part 1), 32 ANTITRUST BULL.
275 (1987).
121 See Wood Hutchinson, supra note 6, at 145 (language "inserted more content into
the rule than the old lists provided").
122 As if to ensure that controversy would continue, the Court issued NCAA a week
after
Copperweld. In what it claimed was a rule of reason analysis, the Court in NCAA examined
competitive effects and found market power, while insisting that market power need not
always be proven. 468 U.S. at 109-11.
123 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1, 19-23 (1984); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 15961 (1984). The importance of such requirement, of course, turns on the breadth of any
per se rules and on the rigor with which market power must be proven. Calkins, Power
and Access, supra note 120, at 276-301. Antitrust observers were reminded recently of the
importance of market power screens. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d
958,965-66(10th Cir. 1994) (citing Rothery Storage and Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986), but not Copperweld).
124 See Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, I F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing factors
to be considered on remand; "inquiry into market power and market structure necessary
to gauge combination under rule-of-reason approach"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1054 (1994);
Islami v. Covenant Medical Ctr., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1361, 1385 (N.D. Iowa 1992) (quoting
Copperweld language and Chicago Board of Trade in denial of defense request for summary
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rejecting "the proposition that [under Section 1] horizontal mergers are
unlawful without regard to competitive effects." ' 5
C.

RELUCTANCE TO INVOKE SECTION

2

Although no Section 2 issues were before the Court in Copperweld, the
opinion may be almost as important in Section 2 litigation as in Section 1.
The flip side of the Court's dichotomy between concerted and unilateral
action is that Section 2 should be reserved for select occasions. The Court
crafted a strongly-worded paragraph that began by noting the Sherman
Act's " 'basic distinction' " between Sections 1 and 2, and continued with
a paean to market deference:
The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful
only when it threatens actual monopolization. It is not enough that a
single firm appears to "restrain trade" unreasonably, for even a vigorous
competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an efficient firm
may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival, whose own
ability to compete may suffer as a result. This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster. In part because it
is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct
with long-run anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman
Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that
the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive
entrepreneur.16

2 7
Once again, some of this language echoes the Solicitor General's brief.
Both the Court and the Solicitor General appended to their sentences

judgment in hospital peer review case); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 693 F. Supp.
262, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (IBM's installation and warranty service charge was not an
unreasonable restraint of trade where plaintiff had failed to define a market and measure
impact; "[wihile lack of proof of a relevant market is not fatal to AMI's claim [citing FTC
v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), an inquiry into market power and
market structure helps determine the competitive impact of a challenged business practice
under the Rule of Reason.") (citing Copperweld), vacated, 33 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994);
Beverage Management, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (S.D.
Ohio 1986) (exclusive dealing case quoting Copperweld on requirements of rule of reason).
25 United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir.) (Posner,
J.) (also citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
920 (1990).
126 467 U.S. at 767-68 (footnotes omitted).
127

See DOJ Merits Brief:
[lIndividual firm decisions on matters such as pricing ...provide the "hard"

competition among independent enterprises that the antitrust laws are designed
to foster. It is often difficult in practice, however, to distinguish between "hard"
competition that benefits consumers (even if it harms rivals) and conduct that
will have the long-run effect of lessening competition and consumer welfare.
Therefore, a relatively nonintrusive standard for unilateral conduct is preferable,
since [otherwise] ... the incentive for firms to compete aggressively would be
materially diluted, to the detriment of consumer welfare.
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about consumer interests (or welfare) a footnote 14 repeating Brunswick's
admonition that the
antitrust laws were enacted to protect "competition,
28
not competitors."'1
This is a rich paragraph, and its language was picked up quickly by
Chicago-minded courts. The Ninth Circuit quoted all of this market
deference paragraph in Drinkwine v. FederatedPublications,Inc.,'129 a brief
opinion affirming a directed verdict on the monopolization charge filed
by the publisher of a "shopper" that was allegedly driven out of business
by the local newspaper. The Seventh Circuit also quoted virtually the
entire paragraph in its important Seventh Circuit opinion, Ball Memorial
Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc.,130 an opinion advancing
the view that intent evidence merits little weight. 3'
Ball Memorial Hospital's language (adopting Copperweld's) was then borrowed by and played a key role for another Seventh Circuit panel, in
Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc.132 Indiana Grocery was an
important decision that affirmed summary judgment against a Section
2 predation claim. The plaintiff's story, if believed, was that Kroger had
embarked on a predatory pricing campaign designed to discipline the
plaintiff (a rival), slow its expansion, and cause it to raise its prices in
Indianapolis, a market with high entry barriers. The court affirmed
summary judgment, reasoning that the theory "[a]t best" threatened an
oligopolistic or duopolistic market. Conduct with that possible end does
not violate Section 2, the court wrote, because Ball Memorial/Copperweld
taught that3 Section 2 is implicated only by "'a danger of monopolization.' ,1 1
(footnotes omitted); see also id. ("Economic harm inflicted on rivals because of their inability
to operate efficiently or to offer products attractive to consumers is not the sort of harm
Congress intended to prevent under the antitrust laws.") (citations omitted); cf. Brief of
Petitioners ("Section 2, by contrast, reaches unilateral action by a single firm and requires
at least a dangerous probability of monopolization.") (citation omitted).
12' 467 U.S. at 767 n. 14 ("We have also made clear that the 'antitrust laws ... were
enacted [etc.].' "); DOJ Merits Brief ("[T]his Court has emphasized that the statutory
goal is the protection of competition, [etc.]."). Professor Wood noted the significance of
reasoning and a result consistent with the consumer welfare-driven vision of antitrust.
Wood Hutchinson, supra note 6, at 96.
129 780 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1087 (1986).
130 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook,
J.).
3 Immediately after the long quotation from Copperweld, Ball Memorial continues,
with
a new paragraph: "So 'intent to harm rivals' is not a useful standard in antitrust." 784
F.2d at 1338. Ball Memorial adds a citation to and quotation of a First Circuit opinion, but
the "So" implies that the thought is implicit in Copperweld.
's
864 F.2d 1409, 1413-14 (7th Cir. 1989) (Bauer, Ch. J.).
ld. at 1413-14, 1416 (quoting BallMemorialHospital, 784 F.2d at 1338, in turn quoting
I3
Copperweld, at 767-68). The pattern of quoting quotations did not end with IndianaGrocery.
In Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1422-23 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 51, 274 (1991), the Sixth Circuit reversed a Section 2 jury
award, quoting at great length from Indiana Grocery (including its quoting of Ball Memorial's
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A particularly important decision limiting Section 2 is Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 3 4 In Alaska Airlines, some relatively small airlines
sued their two largest competitors, alleging that the competitors employed biased computerized reservations systems to harm competition
and gain an unfair advantage. The district court granted a defense
35
motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed.'
Both courts relied heavily on Copperweld to reject monopoly leveraging
as an independent antitrust violation. The district court rejected the
theory as "inconsistent with Copperweld's reading of the section 2 requirement that a monopolist's action must threaten monopolization."' 3 6 The
court of appeals
quoted this same language 37 and clearly relied on the
38
reasoning.
The Third Circuit followed Alaska Airlines in Finemanv. Armstrong World
Industries, 39 which also rejected monopoly leveraging as an independent
theory. That court, too, 40relied principally upon, and quoted at some
length from, Copperweld.
At least one commentator has criticized Alaska Airlines's use of Copperweld,"4 ' and with some justification. Everything in a Section 1 opinion
quoting of Copperweld). Langenderfer's language-if one can call a quotation part of a court's
language-was then quoted at length in Brookeside Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Walker
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,394, at 71,060 (N.D. Ohio 1993),
which granted summary judgment for a monopolist that had engaged in some very aggressive attempts to stifle new competition.
' 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) (Hall, J.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992); seeJames
P. Puhala Il, Note, Berkey Photo and Alaska Airlines: Different Approaches to Monopoly
Leveraging Claims, 16 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 111 (1994) (discussing importance and merit
of Alaska Airlines).
1s5In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust
Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443,
1455 (C.D. Cal. 1988); 948 F.2d at 541.
136 694 F. Supp. at 1455, 1475; see also id. at 1475 ("While halting a monopolists [sic]
advances in their incipiency may represent a rational policy decision, it appears to be ...
a policy precluded by the language of section 2, as well as the purpose of the statute as
interpreted in Copperweld.").
'" 948 F.2d at 541-42.
131 See id. at 549 ("The antitrust laws seek to punish only the willful
attainment and
maintenance of a monopoly, or the attempt to attain such a monopoly.").
"9 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1285 (1993).
140 Id. at 205-06 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 774). Other cases relying on Copperweld's
teaching about conduct short of monopolization include Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc.,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12071, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1994) ("The conduct of a single
firm is governed by 15 U.S.C. § 2 and is unlawful only when the firm's conduct poses a
danger of monopolization.") (citing Copperweld); and Healthco Int'l, Inc. v. A-dec, Inc.,
1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,703, at 61,691 (D. Mass. 1989) (Section 2 applies "only
when there is a showing of actual or potential monopoly power") (citing Copperweld).
'' Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Vertical Strategies by Dominant
Firms, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1255 (1992) ("nothing in the opinion implies that a blatant,
anticompetitive attack by a monopolist on a related market passes scrutiny unless it creates
a new monopoly").
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about Section 2 is dictum. Beyond that, concluding that an attempt should
be punished only if there is a danger of success does not answer the
question of what more than monopoly power should be needed for the
offense of monopolization. Monopoly leveraging may or may not be a
flawed theory, but Copperweld should not be regarded as having given
the theory the coup de grace.
Copperweld has played an important role in limiting the attempted
monopolization offense as well. That opinion's market deference paragraph twice limits Section 2 to actual and probable monopolization:
Single firm conduct "is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization," and the Sherman Act permits scrutiny of individual firms "only
when they pose a danger of monopolization.' 4 2 The same point surfaces
later: The Sherman Act "leaves untouched a single firm's anticompetitive
conduct (short of threatened monopolization)."'14 3 Less than a year after
Copperweld, Justice White pointed to the tension between Copperweld and
more expansive views of the attempt offense. The issue arose when the
Court denied certiorari in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Blanton.144 Justice White
dissented, since the Ninth Circuit's opinion had relied on its earlier,
controversial opinion in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co. 45 Lessig permitted a
finding of a violation of Section 2 without proof of an effect on a relevant
market. Justice White argued that this was inconsistent with Copperweld's
demarkation of the bounds between Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2.146
In his last term on the Court, Justice White was able to accomplish his
Mobil Oil mission by using Copperweld's language to bury Lessig. In Spectrum Sports, an opinion that left unanswered the difficult questions, the
Court ruled unanimously that proof of a dangerous probability of success
of monopolizing a relevant market is essential to the offense of attempted
monopolization."'
Spectrum Sports quoted extensively from Copperweld and cited Copperweld's discussion of the difficulty of distinguishing "robust competition
.,12
467 U.S. at 767-68.
1d.at 775.
U.S. 1007 (1985).
F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
"' 471 U.S. at 1008 ("Section 2 regulates unilateral conduct by outlawing monopolization
and attempted monopolization. Because unilateral conduct is far less likely than concerted
action to pose a threat to competition, '[tlhe conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2
alone and is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization.' ") (quoting Copperweld).
"7 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884 (1993), discussed in Stephen
Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Tern and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62
ANt ITRUSTr L.J. 327, 343-54 (1994), and Daniel]. Gifford, Predatory PricingAnalysis in the
Supreme Court, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 431 (1994).
"471
1,15327
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from conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects."' 4 The Seventh
Circuit relied on this cautionary language in Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc.' 49 to declare, not that care must be taken in deciding
which of Sections 1 or 2 applies, but rather that "a court must be very
sure that a category of acts is anti-competitive before condemning that
category per se."' 5° The Ninth Circuit gave weight to this same cautionary
language from Copperweld in The Jeanery, Inc. v.JamesJeans, Inc.' 'Jeanery
was an important early decision signaling judicial reluctance to permit
terminated dealers to win cases alleging that they had been treated
wrongfully as part of a resale price maintenance conspiracy. 5 '
Even Copperweld's reiteration that it is interested in competition rather
than competitors, 15 although not new, has been important. The repetito the cementing of it in the forefront of
tion of that line contributed
54
antitrust consciousness. '

IV. NON-SHERMAN ACT APPLICATIONS
The legal effect of separate corporate status is important in diverse
areas of law. Litigants in cases not involving the Sherman Act have sought
to rely on Copperweld's declaration that a parent and its wholly owned
113 S. Ct. at 890 & 892 (citing 467 U.S. at 767-69).
776
F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.).
0
15 Id. at 189 (adding citations to Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979),
and NCAA).
'5'849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988) (2-1).
152Although it also gave substantial attention to Monsanto, the Ninth Circuit quoted
extensively from Copperweld. In warning of the dangers of permitting weak evidence to
support a conclusion of conspiracy, the court cited Monsanto and, with a cf. Copperweld,
appending a parenthetical: "explaining that courts must carefully scrutinize allegations of
concerted conduct to ensure that aggressive, procompetitive conduct of a single firm is
not curtailed improperly." 849 F.2d at 1154 (citing 467 U.S. at 768); see also 849 F.2d
at 1156 n.7 (pointing to Copperweld and other Supreme Court cases reflecting "a more
sophisticated use of economic analysis" that requires courts to "be less concerned with
subjective notions of motive and more concerned with the economic effect of challenged
conduct").
153467 U.S. at 767 n.14.
'5'
See R.W. International Corp. v. Welch Food, Inc., 13 F.3d 478, 487 (1st Cir. 1994)
(quoting Copperweld's footnote 14 while affirming dismissal of antitrust claims); Illinois v.
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1482 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The standard aphorism
is that antitrust law protects competition and not competitors ....")(citing Copperweld),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1169 (1992); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d
380, 394 (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 1984, amended Dec. 21, 1984) (error preliminarily to enjoin
new exclusive dealing arrangement) ("The welfare of a particular competitor who may be
hurt as the result of some trade practice is the concern not of the federal antitrust laws,
[citing Copperweld], but of state unfair competition law .. ");Beverage Management, Inc.
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (citing Copperweld's
footnote 14).
'4
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subsidiary have a "complete unity of interests." Courts have generally
extended Copperweld to closely analogous statutes, but further extensions
have been more controversial.' 5 5
The easy decisions involved statutes that paralleled the Sherman Act.
With an exception or two, courts were quick to extend Copperweld to
state antitrust laws, some of which explicitly mimic federal law, some of
which merely look for guidance to federal interpretations. 156 Two courts
applied Copperweld to Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 157 which is
analogous to Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'58 One court, reasoning that
the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act 59 supplements the antitrust
laws and reaches practices that are unreasonable restraints of trade or
invalid trade practices, applied Copperweld to hold that a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary could not conspire to violate that statute. 6 '
Also meeting with considerable approval has been the application of
Copperweld to common law civil conspiracy. Most courts that have considered the question have concluded that parents and wholly owned subsidiaries should be incapable of common law civil conspiracy. 161 This applica15 Extension to Robinson-Patman Act cases is discussed in Part V of this article.
56

Siegel Transfer v. Carrier Express, 856 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Maryland);

Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,282 (D. Minn. 1988) (California,
Colorado, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington statutes); Components, Inc. v. NEC Home
Elecs. (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1549-50 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (California); Stepp v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 623 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (Wisconsin); Ray Dobbins
Lincoln-Mercury v. Ford Motor Co., 604 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D. Va. 1984) (Virginia),
affd without opinion, 813 F.2d 402 (4th Cir. 1985); American Credit Card Tel. Co. v.
National Pay Tel. Corp., 504 So. 2d 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1987) (Florida);
Kenneth E. Curran, Inc. v. Auclair Transp., 128 N.H. 743, 519 A.2d 280 (1986) (New
Hampshire); Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987)
(Wisconsin). But see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So.2d
1149 (La. 1986) (lengthy opinion declining to follow Copperweldwhen interpreting Louisiana
antitrust law); cf. L.C. Williams Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 625 F. Supp. 477, 488 n.10
(M.D.N.C. 1985) (pointing to Copperweld's admission of a gap, and that a single firm's
anticompetitive conduct may have the same effect as an agreement between two firms,
467 U.S. at 774-75, to suggest in dictum that North Carolina's broad language may have
been intended "precisely to fill in such 'gaps' ").
15 15 U.S.C. § 8 ("Every combination, conspiracy... or contract is declared
to be contrary
to public policy, illegal, and void when the same is made by or between two or more
persons or corporations, either of whom ... is engaged in importing any article from any
foreign country ... , and when such combination, conspiracy ... or contract is intended
to operate in restraint of lawful trade ... ").
151 Yamaha Int'l Corp. v. ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,874,
at 65,598-99 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elecs. (U.S.A.),
Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1546-47 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
1'5 15 U.S.C. § 1221 et
seq.
0 Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. Schaumburg Nissan, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12774, at *24-27 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1993) (dismissing conspiracy count).
" Siegel Transfer v. Carrier Express, 856 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (parent and
subsidiary cannot conspire for purposes of Pennsylvania civil conspiracy law); Nissan Motor
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tion has not been free from disagreement, however,
or from claims that
162
Copperweld should be limited to antitrust actions.
Controversy also has arisen, even more sharply, over other applications
of Copperweld. Some courts have declined to apply Copperweld's language
about unity of interests to complaints alleging that a parent corporation
wrongly induced a breach of a wholly owned subsidiary's contract, or
intentionally interfered with that subsidiary's business relations.163 Other
Acceptance Corp. v. Schaumburg Nissan, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12774, at *28 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 13, 1993) (civil conspiracy); Okusami v. Psychiatric Inst., Inc., 959 F.2d 1062,
1067 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (a "cf." citation to support conclusion that corporation, an officer,
and two parent corporations cannot civilly conspire tinder District of Columbia law);
Pizza Management, Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1154, 1165-66 (D. Kan. 1990)
(Copperweld's reasoning applied to Kansas common law conspiracy); Advanced Medical,
Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys., Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13799 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 1988)
(Pennsylvania common law civil conspiracy); Mar-Ren, Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15291 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 1987) (Wisconsin common law). See generally SI
Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (disclosure to wholly
owned subsidiary did not lessen claimed interest in secrecy, since the two corporations
were essentially one).
162 See In re ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 1555, 1568 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (Copperweld "is limited to the context of antitrust actions," and does not apply to
Texas common law, under which parents and subsidiaries may be found to conspire), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Brown v. United States, 976 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1992). Compare
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Tex. Ct. App. Texarkana
1993) (concluding "that Copperweld was restricted to the antitrust context and was not
applicable to common law conspiracies") and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. La Mansion
Hotels & Resorts, Ltd., 762 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1988) (Copperweld irrelevant
to civil conspiracy charge) with Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Misty Prods., Inc., 820 S.W.2d 414
(Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1991) (parent and subsidiary cannot civilly conspire,
applying Copperweld).
One case, in dictum, strongly doubted that Copperweld should be extended to securities
fraud, RICO, and common law conspiracies:
The [Copperweld] court noted that vigorous competition, which is at the base of
our free market economy, is dependent upon the ability of firms to execute unitary
corporate policy and therefore concluded that concerted action within a firm or
between a firm and its wholly owned subsidiary is not constrained by section 1
of the Sherman Act. Since we see no similar social benefit flowing either from
agreements to commit securities fraud or to establish and maintain racketeering
enterprises, or from joint tortious behavior, we question whether Copperweld
should be extended to these contexts.
Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 216,223-24 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (citation omitted) (not making final decision because other conspiracies alleged).
163 See Church of Scientology, Int'l v. Eli Lilly & Co., 848 F. Supp. 1018, 1030 (D.D.C.
1994); see also SunAmerica Fin., Inc. v. 260 Peachtree St., Inc., 202 Ga. App. 790, 415
S.E.2d 677 (1992) (error for trial court to adopt Copperweld'sbright line in tortious interference suit), cert. denied, 202 Ga.App. 907 (Ga. 1992).
Thompson Trading, Ltd. v. Allied Lyons PLC, 124 F.R.D. 534 (D.R.I. 1989), colorfully
dismissed defendants' attempt to rely on Copperweld in a case involving alleged conspiracy
to interfere tortiously with a business relationship. The court noted the narrow reach that
the Supreme Court claimed for Copperweld, and added that the issue was one of state
(Rhode Island) law, even if Copperweld would have controlled were the issue federal.
Finally, it would be incongruous to, on the one hand, hold that Allied Lyons PLC
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courts have been more willing to apply Copperweld in tortious interference
cases. 64 Another controversial area has been civil rights laws. Several
courts have applied Copperweld here. 65 Other courts have stressed that
Copperweld was grounded in the structure of the Sherman Act and rarely
should be extended beyond it.' 66
is incapable of conspiring with its wholly-owned subsidiaries because they are one
entity, and then to hold that this foreign defendant is not subject to this forum's
personal jurisdiction through its subsidiaries because they are separate legal entities. Moreover, defendants would have this Court rule that Allied Lyons PLC is
not responsible for the alleged tortious interference of its subsidiaries because
they are separate entities, but then hold that Allied Lyons PLC could not have
conspired with its subsidiaries because they are one single entity. "Having one's
cake and eating it, too, is not in fashion in this circuit." United States v. Tierney,
760 F.2d 382, 388 (1st Cir. 1985).
124 F.R.D. at 537.
164See Starcom, Inc. v. U.S. Telecom, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18401, at *8 (D. Kan.
Dec. 11, 1991) (relying on Copperweld to conclude that corporation could not have tortiously
interfered with its sister corporation's contract); Rosemount Cogeneration Joint Venture
v. Northern States Power Co., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,351, at 65,410 (D. Minn.
1991) (Copperweld applied to claim of interference with prospective contractual advantage);
American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist.
1991) (applying Copperweld to claim of tortious interference with contract).
b5 See Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Ctr., 921 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("Intra-corporate dealings under § 1985 therefore should receive the
Similarly, § 1985
same treatment as intra-corporate dealings under the Sherman Act ....
aims at preserving independent decisions by persons or business entities, free of the
pressure that can be generated by conspiracies, and again intra-corporate discussions lie
outside the statute's domain."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 60 (1991); Buschi v. Kirven, 775
F.2d 1240, 1251-52 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding support in Copperweld); Scott v. Bristol, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15313 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1990) (relying on Copperweld to hold that under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)) township cannot conspire with township officials acting in their official
capacities.
166See Washington v. Duty Free Shoppers, 696 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(Orrick, J.) (declining to apply Copperweld in 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) case; employees of store
can conspire)
(Antitrust conspiracies, however, are a unique breed. Antitrust laws were designed to promote competition. By prohibiting conspiracies in restraint of trade,
antitrust laws focus on collaboration among competitors. Agreements between
agents of a single business ordinarily do not give rise to the evils that antitrust
laws seek to prevent. . . . Moreover, in the anti-trust context actions within a single
business are presumed to be procompetitive and, therefore, beneficial to society.
In [Copperweld], the Supreme Court demonstrated that the justifications for the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine derived from the special nature of antitrust
law: [quoting from Copperweld] Nowhere did the Courtjustify the doctrine on the
basis that a corporation can act only through its agents and that acts of an agent
are acts of the corporation, thus preventing a plurality of actors.)
(citation omitted); Rebel Van Lines v. Compton, 663 F. Supp. 786, 791 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(refusing to apply Copperweld to § 1985(3) cases) ("The intra-enterprise conspiracy exception
in antitrust law is necessary to prevent antitrust plaintiffs from being able to get around
the more stringent requirements of a monopolization action and hold a single corporate
defendant liable on the less stringent conspiracy to restrain trade theory. As discussed
below, no similar concerns justify insulating the actions of a single company in the context
of civil rights.") (citation omitted); cf. Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898,
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One of the most common sources of litigation has been the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Three months after
the Supreme Court issued Copperweld, the Seventh Circuit, in Haroco,
Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 67 had to apply the "unity of
interests" language to determine whether a wholly owned subsidiary
could be a "person" and its parent corporation a separate "enterprise"
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(2c). 16' The Seventh Circuit quickly
dismissed the argument: Copperweld's holding turned on the Sherman
Act's basic distinction between unilateral and concerted action, unlike
RICO, "which is targeted primarily at the profits from patterns of racketeering activity." 69 Haroco has been persuasive, and many cases have
declined to extend Copperweld to RICO Section 1962(c) 70 or to cases
alleging a RICO conspiracy.' 7 ' But other cases have disagreed and con910 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing split in circuits without taking a position); Byrd v. Salvation
Army, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5576 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 1988) (apply intra-corporate exemption narrowly if at all to § 1985(3) cases, because purposes are very different than in
antitrust).
16' 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd per curiam, 473
U.S. 606 (1985).
168 Id. at 386 (quoting the statute as it then read: " 'It shall be unlawful for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise ...to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity ......"),
affd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c): "Itshall be
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise ... to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt."
169747 F.2d at 403 n.22.
"0 E.g., Elysian Fed. Savs. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp. 737,
757-59 (D.N.J. 1989) (lengthy discussion of Copperweld's different purposes supports conclusion that parent can be the "person" and subsidiary the "enterprise" for § 1962(c));
Wegoland, Ltd. v. Nynex Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20455, at *40-43 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
17, 1991) (report and recommendation of magistratejudge) (following Harocoand rejecting
Copperweld regarding person/enterprise distinction); Pappas v. NCNB Nat'l Bank, 653 F.
Supp. 699 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (following Haroco); Philadelphia TMC, Inc. v. AT&T Info.
Sys., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 169, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (Copperweldinapplicableto § 1982(c) claim;
"The conclusion of the Copperweld Court stemmed from the structure of the Sherman Act
and the nature of the parent corporation-subsidiary corporation relationship."); cf. Lorenz
v. CSX Corp., I F.3d 1406, 1412 (3d Cir. 1993) (in Third Circuit it is "theoretically possible
for a parent corporation to be the defendant and its subsidiary to be the enterprise under
section 1962(c)") (dictum while affirming dismissal of RICO claims); seeJames P. Kennedy,
CivilRICO in the Antitrust Context, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 463,470 (1986) (Copperweld inapplicable
to RICO).
"7 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any
of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section."); see Ashland Oil v. Arnett,
875 F.2d 1271, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting division in district courts, but concluding that
corporation can conspire with officers under RICO; "Since a subsidiary and its parent
theoretically have a community of interest, a conspiracy 'in restraint of trade' between
them poses no threat to the goals of antitrust law-protecting competition. In contrast,
intracorporate conspiracies do threaten RICO's goals of preventing the infiltration of
legitimate businesses by racketeers and separating racketeers from their profits.") (citations
omitted); Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 216, 22324 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (dictum); Wegoland, Ltd. v. Nynex Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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cluded that RICO's purposes would not be served by permitting a parent
or by permitting an
and subsidiary to be "enterprise" and person,
3
intra-enterprise conspiracy to violate RICO.1
Copperweld has received even cooler receptions on other issues. Courts
have shown little inclination to use Copperweld to render impossible criminal conspiracies among parents, subsidiaries, and employees and
agents. 174 Similarly, plaintiffs have met with no success when they have
20455, at *46-48 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1991) (report and recommendation of magistrate
judge) (Copperweld not applicable; parents and subsidiaries should be capable of conspiring);
Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 773 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (parents and
subsidiaries are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1962(d)), revd on other grounds, 985
F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2459 (1993); Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
728 F. Supp. 1123 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 1989) (parent and subsidiary may conspire for RICO;
"While antitrust law seeks to encourage inter-corporate competition even at a cost to intracorporate competition [citing GTE Sylvania], RICO seeks to eliminate all racketeering
activity, both inter-corporate and intra-corporate."); Atlass v. Texas Air Corp., 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5297, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1989) ("antitrust law is not compatible with
RICO law on the topic of conspiracy because of their vastly different goals"); Pandick,
Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. I1. 1986) (intracorporate conspiracies can offend
the purposes of RICO, which are quite different from those of the Sherman Act).
172 E.g., Nebraska Sec. Bank v. Dain Bosworth Inc. 838 F. Supp. 1362, 1368-70 (D. Neb.
1993) (relying on Copperweld to hold that a parent and its subsidiary cannot be a "person"
and an "enterprise"; "a parent corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary are, from an
economic perspective, one and the same"); cf. NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931,
936 (4th Cir. 1987) (parent and subsidiary cannot be "person" and "enterprise," relying
on pre-Copperweld authority without discussing Copperweld); Odishelidze v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Co., 853 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (without discussing Copperweld (on
this point-it was discussed on an antitrust issue) or Haroco, court ruled that the requirement
of a "person" and an "enterprise" was not met by complaint alleging agreement among a
corporation, some of its subsidiaries, and some of its employees); cf. Kovian v. Fulton
County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3526, at *40 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
1990) ("the reasoning employed in Haroco is suspect") (dictum).
13 E.g., Rosemount Cogeneration Joint Venture v. Northern States Power Co., 199 1-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,351, at 65,410 (D. Minn. 1991) (Copperweld applied to § 1962(d)
conspiracy claim); Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 405
n.23 (D. Del.) (dictum) (Copperweld would be an additional bar to claim), modified on other
grounds, 643 F. Supp. 449 (D. Del. 1986); see also DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF CIVIL
RICO 250-51 (1991) (Copperweld persuasive). See generally Towers Fin. Corp. v. Solomon,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12906 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1991) (applying Copperweld to conclude
that parent and subsidiary cannot conspire to violate SEC Act Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b)).
' United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing
uniform authorities); United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1990)
(attempted price fixing is wire fraud; Copperweld does not shield conspiracy between parent
and subsidiary, or among a corporation and its officers, employees, and agents); United
States v. Lov-It Creamery, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1532, 1543 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (rejecting analogy
to Copperweld), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 895 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1990); see Judy L.
Whalley, Crime and Punishment-CriminalAntitrust Enforcement in the 1990s, 59 ANTITRUST
L.J. 151, 156-57 (1990) (discussing Ames). This limited applicability of Copperweld was
anticipated by the Solicitor General in Copperweld:
The mere fact that corporate officers and employees work within a single economic
enterprise does not mean they cannot be co-conspirators in some types of cases.
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sought to rely on Copperweld to impose liability on parent corporations
for acts of subsidiaries.
Parent corporations are not ordinarily directly liable for their subsidiaries' violations of federal or state statutes. Under standard corporate law, however, plaintiffs may "pierce the corporate veil" and reach
parent corporations under certain circumstances. The corporate case
law tends to rely less on reason than on buzz words such as "alter ego,"
"mere instrumentality," "undercapitalized," "perpetrate a fraud," and
"sham." 175
This "alter ego" or "piercing the corporate veil" doctrine is a creature of
state law. It turns on considerations different from those that determine
whether a Sherman Act conspiracy is possible. The Northern District of
California drew this distinction crisply in Bell Atlantic Business Systems
Services v. Hitachi Data Systems Corp., v6 which relied on Copperweld to
grant summary judgment on Sherman Act issues but denied summary
judgment on corporate alter ego liability. The court was untroubled by
the plaintiff's claim that the defendants "are attempting to 'have it both
ways:' "
Plaintiff's attempt to equate § 1conspiracy liability with alter ego liability
fails because § 1 deals with federal antitrust policies and the alter ego
doctrine is governed by California corporation law. The two legal principles have different purposes and policy considerations. It does not
follow that because Hitachi, Hitachi America and Hitachi Data are legally
incapable of conspiring in violation of federal antitrust laws, that Hitachi, the parent, is the alter ego of its subsidiaries.' 77
Other cases are to the same effect.' 78 Similarly, Copperweld did not prevent
a subsidiary from suing its corporate parent pursuant to state corporate
law. The Northern District of Illinois explained its decision as follows:
For example, it is clear that corporate officials within a single economic enterprise
can conspire with each other, e.g., to defraud the government and thereby violate
the law. In addition, where a conspiracy among distinct economic enterprises
exists, a criminal or civil action can be brought under Section 1 against responsible
officials, as well as against the corporations for which they acted.
DOJ Merits Brief (footnote omitted).
175 See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 2.4 (1986); HARRY C. HENN &
JOHN

R.

ALEXANDER,

(3d ed. 1983);
FINANCE
176 849

LAWS OF CORPORATIONS

WILLIAM

A.

AND OTHER BUSINESs ENTERPRISES

344-52

KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND

140-42 (5th ed. 1993).

F. Supp. 702, 707 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
Id. (citation omitted) (in California, whether subsidiaries are "mere instrumentalities"
of parent is a factual issue).
171 See Kacprzycki v. A.C. & S., Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16552, at *10 (D. Del.
177

Oct. 31, 1990) (magistrate's report and recommendation) (Copperveld is "expressly and
unambiguously limited to conspiracies to restrain trade tinder § I of the Sherman Antitrust
Act"); Masa, Inc. v. ICG Keeprite Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7770, at *7 n.3 (N.D. Ill.
June 28, 1989) (declining to apply Copperweld in piercing case; "This court fails to see the
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The key to the [Copperweld] Court's reasoning, however, was its focus
on the underlying concern of the Sherman Act which is to prohibit the
concerted activity of "two independent sources of economic power [that]
previously pursued separate interests." Our conclusion is entirely consistent with the Copperweld decision. We do not hold that a wholly-owned
subsidiary has a separate economic agenda than its parent. We merely
conclude that they are independent entities, each worthy of recognition
9
here. 17

In many different situations, courts have recognized that Copperweld
turned on a balancing of Sherman Act interests that may have little
applicability in other contexts.
V. COPPERWELD AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT: CARIBE
Several courts have addressed the applicability of Copperweld to the
Robinson-Patman Act's' 80 prohibition of certain price discrimination.
Appreciating Copperweld's role in Robinson-Patman issues requires understanding some particularly perplexing aspects of that notoriously
complicated Act. The statutory language is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... either directly or indirectly, to

discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, . . . where the effect of such discrimination may

be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
propriety of applying case law concerning federal anti-trust law to this Illinois tort action.");
United Nat'l Records, Inc. v. MCA, 616 F. Supp. 1429, 1433 (N.D. Il1.1985) ("In fact, the
[Copperweld] Court noted that separate incorporation of a parent and subsidiary often
serves legitimate business and legal interests. One such legitimate interest is undoubtedly
the limited liability a parent corporation enjoys under state law.") (citation omitted); cf.
Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Copperweld'steaching about
unity of interests has no relevance in bankruptcy, where "the question of offset frequently
arises" and "parents and their subsidiaries are treated separately"; the right to pursue
intra-enterprise relief turns on extent of actual control).
An antitrust "piercing" issue was raised in BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v.
BellSouth Corp., 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla.), rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11 th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994). Counter-claimant relied on Copperweld's
language to argue that a parent corporation should be liable automatically for its subsidiary's
alleged violation of Sherman Act Section 2. The court strongly rejected the suggestion:
"As mentioned, Copperweld is a Section 1 case and that opinion only addressed the issue
of separate corporate entities as it related to allegations of conspiracy."). 719 F. Supp. at
1568. The counter-claimant had argued that such liability would be merely the" 'flip side'
of abolishing the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine." Id. at 1567.
"' Stamp v. Inamed Corp., 777 F. Supp. 623, 628 (N.D. I1. 1991).
"o 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
"' Id. The Act provides defenses for discrimination that is cost-justified, justified by the
need to meet competition, or justified by "changing conditions affecting the market for
or the marketability of the goods concerned." For a review of the Act see ABA AN'ITRUST
SEC-r[ON, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS ch. 4 (3d ed. 1992).
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Copperweld has played a gradually increasing role in pricing issues involving parent and subsidiary corporations.
A.

PARENT-SUBSIDIARY ISSUES UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

The question of just who is selling goods, or who should be held
responsible for their sale, arises in Robinson-Patman cases in several
different situations. Although courts have not always distinguished
clearly among the situations and the tests applicable to each, it is helpful to
keep them separate. There are four separate but related issues: Vicarious
liability, and
the indirect purchaser, different purchaser, and single seller
182
doctrines.
1. Vicarious Liability
Parent corporations are no more liable directly when their subsidiaries
violate the Sherman Act'8 3 or Robinson-Patman Act'' than when they
violate other laws.' 85 The leading case on the liability of a parent corporation for a subsidiary's price discrimination is NationalLead Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission.5 6 In National Lead, the Seventh Circuit held that the
FTC should have dismissed a complaint against a parent corporation.
The court explained that for a parent to be liable derivatively "there
must be evidence of such complete control of the subsidiary by the parent
as to render the former a mere tool of the latter, and to compel the
.82
Another somewhat related issue concerns whether the Robinson-Patman Act's "in
commerce" requirement has been met by intrastate sales by a wholesaler. Sales by an
autonomous local subsidiary may be considered separate from the activities of a parent
corporation and thus not subject to the Act (because no sale crossed a state line). E.g.,
Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 880 (9th Cir. 1982) ("we examine the extent
to which the subsidiaries acted as independent distributors in their pricing and marketing
decisions, in effect, breaking the flow of commerce between the manufacturer and the
local retailer"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983); Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A&S Tropical,
Inc., 407 F.2d 4, 9 (5th Cir. 1969); Ashkanazy v. 1. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 757 F. Supp.
1527, 1547 (N.D. II. 1991) (denying summary judgment on this issue) ("To assess the
independence of the subsidiary, a question of fact, courts look to how much control the
parent exerts over the subsidiary's pricing and marketing decisions.") (citing cases on
related control issues).
" E.g., H.J., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1549 (8th Cir. 1989)
(parent corporation not liable for subsidiary's Sherman Act violations where no evidence
showed that subsidiary "was a mere instrumentality or alter ego" of the parent or that the
subsidiary was "a sham corporation formed to shield ITT [the parent] from liability";
opinion discusses Copperweld in another context).
8'4
E.g., Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. Catalyst Energy Corp., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,494, at 60,726-27 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (insufficient to allege merely that violator was "a
'subsidiary and instrumentality' " of parent), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Barket, Levy
& Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1991); see 3 EARL
W. KINTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 2-13 n.289 (1983).
"5 See supra note 175.
816

227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957).

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63

conclusion that the corporate identity of the subsidiary is a mere
fiction."'8 7
2. Indirect PurchaserDoctrine
The "indirect purchaser doctrine" appeared early in Robinson-Patman
history. (This doctrine is unrelated to a Clayton Act doctrine unhappily
bearing the same name.') This body of law, associated closely with the
Federal Trade Commission, holds that a manufacturer may be responsible for the pricing of a nonaffiliated distributor where the manufacturer
has controlled that distributor's pricing.8 9 Since repeal of the Fair Trade
laws effective in 1976,190 plaintiffs have had little success invoking the
indirect purchaser doctrine.' 9' The doctrine lost significance, moreover,
187

Id. at 829 (citing cases) (insufficient that subsidiary was wholly owned and had inter-

locking officers and directors with its parent).
188 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Court held that while direct
purchasers of goods sold at illegally inflated prices may recover the entire overcharge,
indirect purchasers normally may recover nothing. This indirect purchaser doctrine is
summarized in ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 181, at 653-58.
'89 E.g., Purolator Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 883-84 (7th Cir. 1965) (upholding
doctrine and enforcing FTC order; "[i]f the seller controls the sale, he is responsible for
the discrimination in the sale price"); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d
Cir. 1962) (affirming FTC's finding of violation) ("If the manufacturer deals with a retailer
through the intermediary of wholesalers, dealers, or jobbers, the retailer may nevertheless
be a 'customer' or 'purchaser' of the manufacturer if the latter deals directly with the
retailers and controls the terms upon which he buys.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 824 (1962); Kraft-Phoenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537, 546 (1937) (order dismissing
complaint on other grounds explained that retailers buying from wholesalers are considered to be "purchasers" from the manufacturer where the manufacturer promotes sales
directly to the retailers and the manufacturer exerts effective control (here through dissemination of price lists) over the prices charged by wholesalers); cf. Barnosky Oils, Inc. v.
Union Oil Co., 665 F.2d 74, 84 (6th Cir. 1981) (dismissing claim) ("The purpose of the
indirect doctrine is to prevent a manufacturer from insulating itself from Robinson-Patman
liability by using a 'dummy' wholesaler to make sales at terms actually controlled by the
manufacturer.") (citation omitted); Monroe Auto Equip. Co., 66 F.T.C. 276, 299-301
(1964) (Elman, Comm'r, dissenting) (minority view that "indirect-purchaser" doctrine
should be limited to instances in which manufacturers seek to evade the statute by use of
devices such as dummy wholesalers), affd, 347 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1009 (1966). The doctrine is discussed at CYRUS AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND
RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 37-38 (2d rev. ed. 1959), and
FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT § 4.5
(1962).
As if to confuse matters further, the indirect purchaser doctrine has what is known as
a "buyer corollary" that limits a corporation's freedom to disguise discounts by passing
them through an extra entity. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 181, at 429-30.
180Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
181See, e.g., Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 665 F.2d 74, 84 (6th Cir. 1981) (dismissing claim); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019, 1028 (2d Cir.
1976) (comparatively high wholesale prices do not sufficiently "control" retail prices);
Pierce v. Commercial Warehouse, 691 F. Supp. 291, 296-302 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (summary
judgment granted for defendants after searching review because, in significant part, there
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when the Supreme Court expanded the levels at which liability-triggering
competitive injury can be found." 2
3. Different PurchaserDoctrine
The Robinson-Patman Act only addresses discrimination in price between "different purchasers." Early on the question was raised whether,
and if so when, an impermissible discrimination can occur when a parent corporation charges a third party more than it charges its subsidiary.19 3 That a parent-subsidiary sale could trigger Robinson-Patman
liability was first suggested in Danko v. Shell Oil Co. 194 Danko and commentary it spawned found support in the intra-enterprise doctrine, which
then held that parent and subsidiary corporations could be found to
have conspired in violation of Sherman Act Section 1.19 5 Several cases,
some of which discussed the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, indicated that a sale from a parent to its subsidiary can trigger RobinsonPatman liability depending on the extent of the parent corporation's
ownership and control. 196 Some "different purchaser" cases relied on
was "no 'dummy' entity or spurious intermediary"), affd per curiam, 876 F.2d 86 (11 th Cir.
1989); Krause v. General Motors Corp., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,163 (E.D. Mich.
1988) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff purchased cars from franchised dealers); W.H.
Brady Co. v. Lem Prods., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1355, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (insufficient control
where distributors were free to set terms); Kenwood Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,221 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (summary judgment where
manufacturer did not negotiate with or control prices to its independent dealers' customers).
192 Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
193 Comment, Application of the Robinson-PatmanAct to PriceDiscrimination
in Intra-Enterprise
Transactions, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 253, 257 (1958); see also Joseph E. Sheehy, Inplications of
Intra-EnterpriseConspiracyDoctrine in Clayton Act Sections 2 and 3 Cases, 9 SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 83, 107 (1956) (FTC Director of Litigation suggested that discrimination between a sales subsidiary and a rival could have requisite effect on competition).
194 115 F. Supp. 886 (E,D.N.Y. 1953). Danko declined to dismiss a challenge to Shell's
selling gasoline to its company-owned gasoline station for considerably less than it charged
a rival station. Id. at 888 ("The fact that defendant itself may own and control such filling
station would not destroy the relationship of vendor and purchaser. In any event, it is
doubtful that such relationship, if discriminatory, would be permitted to accomplish such
objective. See for analogy, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598,
71 S. Ct. 971, 95 L. Ed. 1199, and cases cited therein.").
'93 See supra note 194; Northwestern Comment, supra note 193, at 257 (noting the connection).
96
1 E.g., Schaben v. Samuel Moore & Co., 462 F. Supp. 1321, 1329-31 (S.D. Iowa 1978)
(subsidiary may be a purchaser, citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), but not, as in this case, "where the corporate bodies involved
act as a single entity"), aff'd per curiam on basis of lower court's opinion, 606 F.2d 831 (8th
Cir. 1979). But cf. Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 256 F. Supp. 581, 585-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (declining to apply intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine; a subsidiary may
be a "purchaser" only if "the corporate entities deal at arm's length").
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the "single seller" cases discussed below, thus suggesting a common approach.",7
Different purchaser jurisprudence took an important turn in 1979,
when the Fifth Circuit, in Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 19
rejected Danko and held that transfers from a parent to its wholly owned
subsidiary can never be sales for Robinson-Patman purposes. Although
it found frequent judicial references to Danko, the Fifth Circuit found
no case in which liability had been premised on Danko's theory. The
court regarded the substance of a parent-subsidiary exchange as an intracompany transfer, which, the court said, was not a sale, thus making
Robinson-Patman liability untenable.
Security Tire justified its bright line rule by saying that the RobinsonPatman Act did not intend to regulate intracorporate transactions and
that such transactions could have no competitive effect. It also suggested-somewhat unfairly-that its rule was consistent with the rules
employed for the "indirect purchaser" doctrine' 99 and the "single seller"
doctrine. '00 Both doctrines turn on control, however, which the court
noted, without seeming to acknowledge the sharp degree to which it was
departing from those approaches.
Although lower court authority remains mixed, the trend has been
decidedly in favor of the Security Tire rule.2"' Just as some of the decisions
'9'Carroll-McCreary Co. v. New Jersey Steel Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,436,
at 76,280 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (relying in part on Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F.
Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y.1957), in declining to dismiss case where control was not clear); Reines,
256 F. Supp. at 585 (heavy reliance on Bairn & Blank). But see Brown v. Hansen Publications,
Inc., 556 F.2d 971, 971-72 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (sheet music distribution corporation not a "purchaser" from its sister Music publishing corporation where the two shared
office space, employees, accounting, etc.; the distribution firm's pricing discretion might
be important to the "single seller" issue (citing Baini & Blank) but not to this one).
A footnote in Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973, 977 n.2 (6th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam), traced the argument that subsidiaries can be "purchasers" and "customers" to the
intra-enterprise conspiracy cases. The court asserted that the same "domain and control"
standard was used to determine a subsidiary's status as a plaintiff, a parent's and subsidiary's
status as a "single seller," and a nonaffiliated distributor's status as a supplier to an "indirect
purchaser" from the manufacturer. Although it declined to decide the issue, the court
noted that "[tihere appears to be general agreement that there can be no sale under the
Act unless the parties deal at arm's length, although the argument has been advanced that
the realistic effect on competition, rather than the question of control, should be the
standard." Id. (citations omitted) (dictum; improper damages had been awarded tinder
any theory).
'9'598 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1979).
"99 Supra Part V.A.2.
200 infra Part V.A.4.
201 See O'Byrne v. Cheker Oil Co., 727 F.2d 159, 164 (7th Cir. 1984) (cannot compare oil
company's wholesale prices to terms under which company retail stores obtained product);
Island Tobacco Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 726, 734 (D. Haw. 1981)
("intra-enterprise transfers cannot be considered sales for Robinson-Patman Act price
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following Danko had drawn support from the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine then in effect,2 °2 the more recent decisions give significant
weight to Copperweld's declarations that a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary are a single economic unit. In City of Mt. Pleasant,0 3 the Eighth
Circuit extended Security Tire to sales by an electricity generation-andtransmission cooperative to the retail-distribution cooperatives that together owned it. The court reasoned that what were nominally sales
within the cooperative system had no economic consequence, and liability
should not turn on whether or not the system was organized as a corporation with divisions. 204 The Sixth Circuit also relied heavily on Copperweld
when it decided to adopt Security Tire in Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v.
Marathon Petroleum Co.20 5 Judge Cornelia Kennedy wrote a powerful
dissent explaining that Copperweld was grounded in a distinction between
unilateral and concerted action that had no relevance to the RobinsonPatman Act. 20 6 The trend, however, is against her.
4. Single Seller Doctrine
The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits certain discriminatory sales by a
"person." The "single seller" doctrine sought to determine when sales
discrimination purposes"). But cf. Supra USA Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 1987-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 67,760, at 59,068 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying motion for certification for
interlocutory appeal) ("Copperweld [is] inapposite" and Security Tire rule should not be
adopted); Carroll-McCreary Co. v. New Jersey Steel Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,436, at 76,280 (E.D.N.Y.1980) (declining to follow Security Tire at that time).
Thoughtful articles have discussed the trend favoring Security Tire and applauded it,
Howard Shelanski, Robinson-PatmanAct Regulation of IntraenterprisePricing,80 CAL. L. REV.
247 (1992), and criticized it, John Huddleston, Comment, Can Subsidiaries Be "Purchasers"
from Their Parents Under the Robinson-PatmanAct? A Pleafor a ConsistentApproach, 63 WASH.
L. REV. 957 (1988).
202 See supra notes 195-97.
203 838 F.2d 268, 277-79 (8th Cir. 1988).
204 Id. at 279. In reaching this conclusion the Eighth Circuit gave significant weight to
Copperweld, concluding that "it would, in our opinion, be completely anomalous to hold,
on the one hand, that the cooperative is a single enterprise which cannot conspire with
itself under the Sherman Act, and, on the other hand, that the same single enterprise
cannot enjoy the fruits of vertical integration by transferring goods between its constituent
units at a 'price' below what it charges outsiders." Id.
205 772 F.2d 214, 221 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Russ'Kwik noted that Copperweld said
that " '[aintitrust liability should not depend on whether a corporate subunit is organized
as an unincorporated division or a wholly owned subsidiary.' Admittedly, the Court was
dealing there with combinations or conspiracies between parent and subsidiary. However,
the Court stated without qualification, that 'a subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent.' "
Id. (quoting Copperweld). The Sixth Circuit also quoted Copperweld's statement that " 'the
ultimate interests of the subsidiary and the parent are identical, so the parent and the
subsidiary must be viewed as a single economic unit.' So, here, the parent and subsidiary
are a single economic unit. The Robinson-Patman Act is not concerned with transfers
between them." Id. (quoting Copperweld).
206 Id. at 221-23 (Kennedy,J., dissenting); see also Huddleston, supra note 201, at 972-73.
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by a parent and a subsidiary should be considered sales by a single
person.2 °7 (Clarity might have been aided had the doctrine been called
the "single selling person" doctrine.) The relationship between this question and the "different purchaser" doctrine has not gone unnoticed.0 8
An important 1957 opinion, Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp.,20 9 provided substantial comfort to prospective defendants by drawing on the
language of corporate piercing law. 21 ) Baim & Blank, a Brooklyn appliance retailer, complained that Philco Corporation charged higher prices
to Baim & Blank than to a twenty-eight-store New York area retail chain.
Philco won summaryjudgment by showing that whereas the chain bought
directly from Philco, Baim & Blank bought from Philco Distributors,
Inc. Although Philco Distributors was wholly owned and, with one exception, was led by the same officers as the parent, Baim & Blank could not
show that the subsidiary was "merely the alter ego of the parent" and
that "they acted in legal effect as one seller., 21' The leading price discrimination text saluted Baim & Blank, 2 and ever since then plaintiffs have
faced an uphill battle in proving that a parent and subsidiary are a
single selling person. Courts addressing the single seller doctrine have
inconsistently based decisions on alter ego, control over pricing, and more
general control standards, and have casually cited different purchaser
doctrine and even vicarious liability cases.213
207 This issue is of importance principally in secondary line Robinson-Patman cases, since
primary line Robinson-Patman and Sherman Act Section 2 predatory pricing actions largely
overlap. No sensible predatory pricing analysis of a subsidiary's pricing would accept
unquestioningly the transfer prices paid by the subsidiary as costs. See Vollrath Co. v.
Sammi Corp., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,955, at 63,131 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (relying
on Copperweld to suggest it would be improper to base a predatory pricing case on the
intracorporate transfer prices paid by a Japanese manufacturer's U.S. subsidiary) (dictum,
since defendants would prevail regardless how the issue is resolved), aff'd, 9 F.3d 1455
(9th Cir. 1993) (without discussing issue), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2163 (1994).
208 E.g., Irving Scher, The Robinson-PatmanAct:Jurisdictionalissues, in PLI, NEW ROBINSON-

PATMAN ACT DEVELOPMENTS,

at 30 ("[r]elated question") (1990); Robert R. Vawter, Jr.,

Jurisdiction, Commerce and Exemptions; Sales, Commodities and Like Grade and Quality Requirements, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 857 (1985) ("Closely related to the question of two separate
purchasers is the issue of when there is one seller for Robinson-Patman purposes.").
209 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
211

See supra notes 175-79.

2' 148 F. Supp. at 544.
212

RowE, supra note 189, at 53-56. Although Rowe praised Bairn & Blank, he concluded

by writing that a single seller could be found "only upon affirmative proof of the parent's
direction or participation in the subsidiary's pricing." Id. at 56. He cautioned that "recognition of a sales subsidiary as a separate legal entity also creates the possibility that the parent
corporation's prices to its own subsidiary may be exposed to the tests of Robinson-Patman."
Id. at 56 n.43. Unwittingly anticipating an unwinding of the law, he found support for
the treatment of subsidiaries as separate in the intra-enterprise conspiracy cases. Id. at 56
n.44.
'"E.g., Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 637 F.2d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant, because "the record contains no proof that Sony con-
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The challenge to single seller doctrine plaintiffs did not lessen after
Security Tire and Copperweld. In Acme Refrigeration of Baton Rouge, Inc. v.
Whirlpool Corp.214 the trial court had extended Security Tire to find that
a parent and its subsidiary are a single entity. The court of appeals, by
a panel that included Security Tire's author, disagreed. Security Tire had
"left intact" the single seller doctrine. 2 5 Before finding a "single entity,"
it wrote, "there must be an 'affirmative showing' that the parent actively
controls its subsidiary."2' 1 6 Although this rule would seem to place on the
plaintiff the burden of proof of this issue, the court noted that the
plaintiff had "never pleaded actual control"; in denying a petition for
rehearing, the court declared that it had "intended to make no holding
to locate or measure the
7 burden of proof on the issue of control by the
parent corporation."
B.

CARIBE

Caribe gave the First Circuit a chance to address the single seller doctrine. Defendant BMW AG had won dismissal of price discrimination
and resale price maintenance claims filed by a Puerto Rican importerretailer of BMW automobiles.21 8 The case law on the single seller doctrine
was in BMW's favor; the trend in the decisions on another issue-the
trolled the resale prices of Sonama [Sony's subsidiary], or exercised dominion and control
over its subsidiary") (citing Reines); Island Tobacco Co. v. RJ. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 513
F. Supp. 726, 734-35 (D. Haw. 1981) (granting defense motion for summary judgment
where plaintiff sought, with internal inconsistency, to compare a price paid by a subsidiary
to a parent to a price paid by plaintiff to the subsidiary) ("a purchase from a wholly-owned
subsidiary will be considered as if it were made from the parent company if the subsidiary
is the alter ego or mere tool, agent or instrumentality of the parent, without a separate
existence and pricing policy of its own. The critical element in determining whether parent
and subsidiary are to be treated as a single seller is control, particularly control of the
subsidiary's pricing and distribution policies.") (citations of Reines and National Lead, and
other cases, omitted); Miles v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F. Supp. 869, 871 (E.D. Wis.
1973) (granting summary judgment for defendant; ownership of subsidiary not sufficient
to make parent responsible for sales by subsidiary). Different purchaser doctrine decisions
in turn have casually cited single seller cases. See supra note 197.
214 785 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.), petition for rehearingand suggestion for rehearingen banc denied,
785 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (briefly clarifying prior opinion), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 848 (1986); see also cases cited supra note 213.
215 785 F.2d at 1243.
216 Id. (judgment n.o.v. should have been granted) ("In the absence of evidence that
Whirlpool either actively controlled Heil-Quaker or the terms of the latter's sales, we must
conclude that they are not the same seller.") (citations omitted).
217 785 F.2d 1245, 1245 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam opinion on petition for rehearing
and suggestion for rehearing en banc) ("The evidence on that issue in this case denied
that control, and neither pleading nor proof from the buyer implicated the existence of
control."). In Acme, the subsidiary's chief executive officer was neither an officer nor director
of the parent, and the subsidiary's pricing and distribution decisions were made solely by
its own personnel without consultation with the parent. The plaintiff's evidence consisted
of an affidavit showing the existence of consolidated financial statements. Id. at 1244.
21' 821 F. Supp. 802 (D.P.R. 1993).
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so-called "availability" defense-was favorable;
defense to the resale price maintenance claim
in the courts.2 19 Yet the First Circuit reversed
Breyer (as I shall refer to him, since he wrote
joined by Judges Boudin and Coffin.
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and its "antitrust injury"
was on a winning streak
in an opinion by Judge
as a circuit court judge)

The opinion would be important even were its author not now on the
Supreme Court. It applies Copperweld to create a split in the circuits and
raises practical Robinson-Patman compliance problems. It evinces more
deference to the purposes of that controversial Act than courts have
sometimes shown. 22 0 And it declines to employ the antitrust injury concept to achieve an arguably procompetitive substantive end that neither
Congress nor any court has been willing to accept. 22 ' With the author
now writing opinions binding on all the circuits, the opinion is that much
more important.
1. The District Court
Caribe's facts are critical but relatively simple. BMW AG funnels most
of its North American sales through a wholly owned wholesaler, BMW
of North America, Inc. (BMW NA). Most North American retailers buy
BMW automobiles from BMW NA, which in turn buys them from BMW
AG. Caribe was different. For almost a decade Caribe bought automobiles
in Germany directly from BMW AG and sold them at retail in Puerto
Rico.222 This bypassing of the infamous "middle man" failed to work to
Caribe's advantage, however; to the contrary, according to the complaint
Caribe paid more for cars than BMW NA charged other retailers, as
well as (obviously) more than BMW NA paid. After BMW AG terminated
its contract with Caribe in December 1990, Caribe filed
an action claiming
223
that it had been injured by the pricing disparity.
The district court examined separately the pricing by BMW AG to
BMW NA, and by BMW NA to retailers, and found that neither set of
219

See

ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS,

supra note 181, at 650-52; William Page, The

Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization,Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary

Sufficiency, 75
220

VA.

L. REV. 1221 (1989).

Cf. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Mikva, J.,

dissenting) (majority disregarded policies chosen by Congress). David Balto, in a discussion
principally of Judge Breyer's other Robinson-Patman opinions, has discerned a tension
between Judge Breyer's interest in economic efficiency and his commitment to interpreting
statutes fairly in light of legislative history. David A. Balto, The Robinson-Patman Act and
Price Discrimination, Address at the Seminar on Antitrust for the '90s, The Second Century
of Change, Minnesota Institute for Legal Education (July 14, 1994).
221The antitrust injury issues deserve a separate article and are not addressed here.
222 19 F.3d at 747.
223This article does not discuss Caribe's claimed violations of the rule against resale
price maintenance and of the Puerto Rico Dealers' Contracts Act.
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lower prices supported a claim. Caribe could not challenge the price
paid by BMW NA because Caribe did not allege that it competed with
BMW NA in selling automobiles to retailers.224 Caribe could not challenge
the price other retailers paid to BMW NA because, under what the court
regarded (with some justification) as settled law, BMW AG and BMW
NA could be regarded as a single seller only if Caribe had affirmatively
pleaded that BMW AG actively controlled the terms under which BMW
NA sold merchandise.2 25 Because even the Second Amended Complaint
alleged nothing more than 100 percent stock ownership,22 6 the court was
unwilling to regard BMW AG as having made the two sales requisite for
Robinson-Patman Act liability.
As a separate basis for dismissing the complaint, the court ruled that
lower prices were always available to Caribe through the simple expedient
of buying from BMW NA, rather than BMW AG. 2 7 The court also
dismissed Caribe's allegations that BMW violated Robinson-Patman Act
Sections 2(c), (d), and (e), which govern brokerage payments and allowances and services.228 The district court said that Caribe had done nothing
22 9
more than invoke some "antitrust 'buzzwords,' "which is not sufficient.
2. The Appeal
On appeal, plaintiff Caribe's briefs did little damage to the defendants'
position. Caribe did not mention Copperweld in connection with the Robinson-Patman Act.22 0 Apparently adopting a strategy of obfuscation, Caribe argued that it competed with BMW NA as an "importer" of automo224

821 F. Supp. at 812.

225

Id. at 811-12. For this proposition the court relied on Acme Refrigeration, Bairn &

Blank, Island Tobacco Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 726 (D. Haw. 1981),
and, with a "see also" citation, Security Tire.
226 Second Amended Complaint, Caribe, 3 ("Upon information and belief, it [BMW
N.A.] is a wholly owned subsidiary of BMW A.G."); see also 821 F. Supp. at 812. ("Caribe's
unsupported conclusion that BMW AG and BMW NA are a single entity ... cannot survive
the defendants' well-founded challenge, particularly considering that plaintiff has had
ample warning and opportunities to meet its burden.").
227 Id. at 813 (noting that Caribe had rejected an offer to buy from BMW NA because
Caribe "did not want to lose unspecified benefits as BMW AG's importer-retailer").
228

Second Amended Complaint, Caribe,

19(c)-(e); see ANTITRUST

LAW DEVELOPMENTS,

supra note 181, at 431-44.
229 821 F.Supp. at 813-14.
230 Cf. Brief of Appellant Caribe BMW, Inc., at 25 (Without making much of it, appellants
had drawn the connection with Copperweld while discussing it in terms of Sherman Act
standing: "Just as under the 'single entity' doctrine described above, BMW A.G. and BMW
N.A. are viewed as a single entity for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act.") (citing
Copperweld and quoting three sentences from the case, including the discussion of an
enterprise's "unity of interest").
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biles and "in the downstream marketing of those cars, '2 ' glossing over
the difference between selling to retail dealers and to consumers. Caribe
went on to argue that there is a "traditional 'separate seller' doctrine" and
also a "trend toward a categorical conclusion that parent and subsidiary
corporations are a single seller," and under either approach Caribe
should win (by comparing its relatively high prices with the lower ones
paid by retail dealers to BMW NA, on the one hand, and by BMW NA
to BMW AG, on the other).,32 This argument ignored (a) the fact that
Caribe did not actually compete with BMW NA, and thus could not
complain about prices paid by that subsidiary, and (b) that the trend that
Caribe described concerned the different purchaser doctrine rather than
the single seller doctrine. In contrast, in each of the relatively few reported single seller decisions, parental liability turned on the 'parent's
active control over the subsidiary. 33
Then at oral argument BMW's lawyer, Irving Scher, encountered
Judge Breyer.234 Breyer peppered Scher with questions, keeping him
for almost twice the allotted time. Scher later observed that Breyer was
concerned about symmetry: It seemed anomalous to Breyer that parentsubsidiary sales could be protected from challenge because many courts
do not consider intracompany transfers sales to different purchasers,
but that a parent and subsidiary should not then automatically be considered a single seller. In this context, during oral argument Breyer noted
that some courts had applied Copperweld in "different purchaser" cases.
Breyer also was interested in preventing evasion of the Robinson-Patman
Act. He wondered aloud whether economic considerations necessitated
treating some parents as separate from wholly owned subsidiaries for
purposes of the single seller doctrine.
3. The Opinion
In the First Circuit's Caribe opinion, Copperweld was the fulcrum for
Robinson-Patman analysis. Caribe reversed the findings that the availability defense protected BMW 235 and that the complaint's allegations con23 Brief of Appellant Caribe BMW, Inc. at 9.
232
233

id. at 11-12.
This was called to the First Circuit's attention. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 13-

15.
23'This account of the oral argument is based on an interview with Irving Scher.
215The court held that there can be no availability defense "if the disfavored customer

does not know about the favored treatment." 19 F.3d at 752 (italics removed). This is not
controversial. E.g., Irving Scher, How Sellers
Can Live with the Robinson-PatmanAct, 41 Bus.
LAW. 533, 537 (1986) ("Under current law, the seller must make the availability of the
lower price known to all competing customers, and all of the conditions that must be met
to obtain the favorable price must be attainable by most customers.") (citing cases). But cf.
Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276,
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36
cerning brokerage and allowances and services had been inadequate.
The more important part of the opinion, however, addressed the single
seller doctrine. The court concluded its analysis by "find[ing] it appro-

priate to apply Copperweld's reasoning outside Sherman Act § 1 ,,237

The court of appeals gave three reasons for this conclusion. The first
reason relied entirely on and quoted extensively from Copperweld, as
follows:
1283 (9th Cir.) (where, in only occasion of price discrimination, the discount was available
to any buyer of more the $300 in goods, it was "not enough" that members of plaintiff
association "did not remember having received the offer"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
The puzzling thing about the court's principal basis for rejecting the availability defense
is that no one else-not BMW, the district court, nor even Caribe-seemed to think
the argument important. Caribe's principal assertion was that the lower prices were not
practically available because qualifying for them would have required Caribe to change
its status from "importer" to "merely a retailer." This is the only "availability" argument
mentioned in Caribe's brief. Brief of Appellant Caribe BMW, Inc. at 17 (subsection headed,
"Caribe was not required to alter its purchasing status when faced with BMW's discriminatory pricing"). Although it mentioned in passing that Caribe had said it was not told about
favorable terms available to retailers, the district court concluded that Caribe would not
have become a retailer to obtain those terms at the cost of losing unspecified benefits as
an importer. 821 F. Supp. at 813. The district court also explained that, contrary to Caribe's
suggestion, BMW had no obligation to announce that were Caribe to become a BMW NA
customer it would have enjoyed the same benefits as other customers.
The First Circuit ignored these arguments and relied instead on a sentence in the
complaint that suggested that Caribe may not have known about the lower prices. 19 F.2d
at 752 (" '[u]nbeknowst to Caribe, and beginning by at least 1987, BMW began lowering its
prices for BMWs sold to Caribe's competitors .......
) (quoting complaint) (brackets and
italics by court). This was sufficient for the court of appeals to conclude that the complaint
could not be dismissed on availability grounds.
On the question of whether lower prices are "available" even if Caribe could enjoy them
only by buying from BMW NA, the district court ruled for BMW. 821 F. Supp. at 81213. The court of appeals treated this issue somewhat casually. Without going so far as to
say that a change in status always precludes a finding of availability, the court found it
sufficient that Caribe claimed that switching its source of supply from BMW AG to BMW
NA would cause it to lose various unnamed advantages flowing from its status as importer.
There was no need, to resist a motion to dismiss, to indicate what those claimed advantages
were-and, indeed, Caribe's complaint and briefs are silent on the subject.
216 The court was somewhat forgiving in its reversal of these claims. Caribe went no
further than to allege that other retailers had enjoyed "lower prices and 'other economic
advantages' which were not made available to Caribe on proportionately equal terms."
Brief of Appellant Caribe BMW, Inc. at 23 (quoting complaint). Nowhere was the nature
of these "other economic advantages" indicated. Instead, Caribe's brief merely said that
the reference to economic advantages "serves to envelop not only rebates, discounts, or
allowances," but also such things as "cooperative advertising; handbills; demonstrators and
demonstrations; catalogs; cabinets; display materials; [and] prizes or merchandise for
conducting promotional contests." Id. at 23-24 (citing FTC Advertising Guide). Without
significant analysis or discussion the court of appeals reversed the district court, saying
that the pleadings, though "rather sparse ...are sufficient to give BMW AG and BMW
NA notice of the substance of Caribe's complaint." 19 F.3d at 752.
237 19 F.3d at 751 (citing City of Mount Pleasant and Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon
Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214, 221 (6th Cir. 1985), different purchaser cases where courts
followed Security Tire in part because of Copperweld, and, in a "cf." cite, United States v.
Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 979 (2d Cir. 1984), which (without citing Cop-
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It [Copperweld] held that ... a wholly owned subsidiary could not "conspire" with the parent. That, the Court said, is because they have
a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common,
not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or
determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but
one.... [And t]hey share a common purpose whether or not
the parent keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary....
The Court added that a "corporation has complete power to maintain"
a portion of the enterprise either in the form of an unincorporated
division, or in the form of a separately incorporated subsidiary. But,
the
economic, legal, or other considerations that lead corporate
management to choose one structure over the other are not
relevant to whether the enterprise's conduct seriously threatens
competition.
For these reasons, the Court held,
the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 38

The Caribe court concluded that Copperweld's reasoning should be applied
to Robinson-Patman single seller cases. "In essence, the [Copperweld]
Court saw an identity of economic interest between parent and wholly
owned subsidiary that, considered in terms of the economically oriented
antitrust laws, warrants regarding them as one.2 139 Little would be gained,
Judge Breyer wrote, by searching for those "few and far between" instances "in which a wholly owned subsidiary
would intend to act contrary
240
to the economic interests of its owner.,
perweld) assertedly "attribut[ed] subsidiary's activity to parent for purposes of Clayton
Act § 7"). (In fact, Waste Management's treatment of subsidiaries was more linguistic than
analytical, and apparently owed nothing to Copperweld.)
211 19 F.3d at 749 (citations omitted).
219

Id. at 749-50.

240 Id. at 750. Caribe evinces a distaste for case-specific factual examination:

Any claimed instance of truly "independent," owner-hostile, subsidiary decisionmaking would meet with the skeptical question, "But, if the subsidiary acts
contrary to its parent's economic interest, why does the parent not replace the
subsidiary's management?" Given the strength of that joint economic interest, we

do not see how a case-specific judicial examination of "actual" parental control
would help achieve any significant antitrust objective. Those instances in which
a wholly owned subsidiary would intend to act contrary to the economic interests
of its owner are likely few and far between, and, if they ever exist, would seem
hard to prove.
Id. at 750 (citing, as a cf., Areeda and Kaplow's summary discussion of the rationale for

per se rules,

AREEDA

& KAPLOW, supra note 6, at

215).

Although single opinions are limited evidence, judicial views on the value of certainty
are central to many antitrust decisions. Much recent Supreme Court antitrustjurisprudence
has been marked by a majorityndriven search for increased objectivity. Calkins, More Objectivity, supra note 147; Stephen Calkins, The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust:
Toward Greater Certainty, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 615 (1991) (contrasting views of Justices
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Caribe'ssecond reason echoed a concern raised during oral argument:
Robinson-Patman evasion. A manufacturer should not be able to "avoid
the law simply by creating a wholly owned, but 'independent' [subsidiary]."2 4'
Oral argument also anticipated the court's third reason, namely, that
"applying Copperweld avoids a potential anomaly.",42 The court perceived
an anomaly if a parent and subsidiary were regarded as a single entity
for the different purchaser doctrine (based in part on Copperweld) but
not the single seller doctrine. The simplest resolution, according to the
court, was "to hold in parallel fashion that ownership alone makes a
'single seller' of a firm and its wholly owned distributor, just as ownership
alone eliminates the possibility of a Robinson-Patman Act 'sale' between
them. 2 43
4. Appraisal
There is much to admire in Judge Breyer's Caribe opinion. Only a
judge committed to rationalizing the law could have authored it. Caribe
won on arguments it never made. Copperweldis at the heart of the opinion;
but only Breyer made an issue of Copperweld.244 Caribe won the availability
issue based on reasoning different from that in its brief.245 The court
relied heavily on secondary sources not cited by the litigants, and it cited
cases not mentioned in the briefs. 46
Scalia and Stevens). The pattern has been most conspicuous in predatory-pricing law,
where courts prefer to examine costs and recoupment potential rather than subjective
intent. Cf. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer,
].) (choosing a bright line predatory pricing test). Interest in objectivity also has driven
the preference for bright lines in state action, vertical price restraint law, and extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws. See Calkins, More Objectivity, supra note 147, at 359-68 (discussing the short shrift given comity balancing approaches in Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993)). Caribe suggests tentatively that Justice Stevens, the
Justice most reluctant to sacrifice other values to greater antitrust certainty, may not have
gained an ally on this pivotal issue.
4' 19 F.3d at 750. The court recognized that some of the Robinson-Patman Act's strictures may interfere with sensible distribution programs but the court asserted that "these
same problems exist, in one form or another, regardless of our holding in this case." Id. at
750 (emphasis in original).
242 Id. at 750.
2
11 Id. at 751.
2144See supra note
230.
2145See supra note 235.
246 The court cited 7 AREEDA, supra note 6, at 1 1464, 19 F.3d at 750; AREEDA & KAPLOW,
supra note 6, at

601(c) (cited twice), 19 F.3d at 748, 749; AREEDA & KAPLOW at 215, 19
& BAUER, supra note 184, § 21.11 at 192-93, 19 F.3d at 748; KINTNER
& BAUER § 21.16, at 212, 19 F.3d at 749; KINTNER & BAUER at § 22.14, 19 F.3d at 750;
KINTNER & BAUER § 25.7, at 454-60 (cited twice), 19 F.3d at 750, 751; and James F. Rill,
Availability and Functional Discounts Justifying Discriminatory Pricing, 53 ANTIlRUST L.J. 929
(1985) (cited twice), 19 F.3d at 750. None of these citations was in the briefs.

F.3d at 750;

KINTNER
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Caribe's reliance on Copperweld also has considerable appeal. Commentators found support in the early intra-enterprise cases for the conclusion
that a parent and its subsidiary are not necessarily a single seller. 47 The
early different purchaser cases relied on the intra-enterprise cases to
support possible liability. 248 Then, after Copperweld, certain RobinsonPatman defendants succeeded in persuading courts to rely on the new
intra-enterprise doctrine to reject liability, because a subsidiary cannot
be a different purchaser.249 Single seller issue opinions have relied on
different person opinions, and vice versa. 250 Caribe continues this blending of standards and creates symmetry by treating a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary as a single entity for purposes of the single seller as
well as the different purchaser doctrines.
Although there is much to admire in Caribe,the opinion fails to address
thoroughly some countervailing considerations. That the opinion has
weaknesses is not surprising, since the court worked without benefit of
briefing on questions the court regarded as central. The Copperweldbased Robinson-Patman part of the opinion is vulnerable to questioning
on several grounds.
a. Copperweld Should Have Little Applicability to
Robinson-Patman Act Litigation
Caribe gave Copperweld excessive weight. Copperweld was driven in large
measure by the distinction, championed by the Solicitor General, between
Perhaps most centrally, the court wrote that although Copperweld "spoke of Sherman
Act § I and of 'coordinated activity,' its reasoning applies here," and cited Professors
Areeda's and Kaplow's text. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra at 929. In fact, that normally excellent
text is weak on this point and devotes only a single paragraph to it. The paragraph explains
that courts increasingly regard intra-enterprise transfers as not sales for Robinson-Patman
purposes. As for whether a subsidiary's sales should be attributed to the parent, Areeda
and Kaplow state as follows: "Although there is little authority on this question-apart
from occasional holdings that members of the same corporate family are separate persons
unless one is the alter ego of the other [citing Baim & Blank]-the courts probably would
not allow a seller to practice otherwise unlawful discrimination through the simple formality
of using two selling corporations." AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra at 929. The authors declare
that both conclusions "are reinforced by the Supreme Court's Copperweld holding." This
paragraph may or may not provide sound policy advice, but it fails to discuss Acme
Refrigeration, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 785 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848
(1986), and the other authorities cited supra note 213.
Caribe also cited several cases not included in any brief: Massachusetts Brewers Ass'n v.
P. Ballantine & Sons Co., 129 F. Supp. 736, 739 (D. Mass. 1955); Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323
F.2d 44, 46-47 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); and Century Hardware
Corp. v. Acme United Corp., 467 F. Supp. 350, 355-56 (E.D. Wis. 1979). 19 F.3d at 749,
752. Each case was included in a string citation with one or more other cases that were
included in a brief, and none of the cases appears to have contributed to the court's
reasoning or result.
247
See supra note 212.
248 See supra notes 195-96, 212.
249 See supra notes 203-05.
250 See supra notes 197 & 213.
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unilateral and concerted action. From that distinction flowed the interpretation of the words "contract, combination ...or conspiracy." The
key was policy, not language. "Because coordination between a corporation and its division does not represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of economic power previously pursuing separate interests,
it is not an activity that warrants § 1 scrutiny., 25' And because a corporation's agreement with its wholly owned subsidiary is indistinguishable in
competitive effect from an agreement with a division, such an agreement
cannot support a Section 1 violation.252
This reasoning has limited applicability to the Robinson-Patman Act.
Caribe interpreted the statutory word "person" and considered when
sales by two legally separate corporations should be considered sales by
a single selling "person." The answer may not rest on whether the two
corporations can lessen competition or sacrifice independence through
an agreement.
Copperweld did not declare that all wholly owned subsidiaries should
be considered part of their parents for purposes other than Sherman
Act conspiracy law. Many courts have limited Copperweld's scope. Courts
do not rely on Copperweld to shield criminal conspiracies,253 or to impose
liabilities on parents for acts of subsidiaries, 54 or to prevent a subsidiary
from suing its parent.25 5 In other areas of the law, as well, many courts
have recognized that Copperweld turned on unique Sherman Act considerations and should not be applied broadly beyond that statute.256
One could distinguish these cases limiting Copperweld because they do
not interpret an antitrust law such as the Robinson-Patman Act provision
interpreted by Caribe.257 Courts have long recognized the tension between
the purposes of the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts, however. Because Copperweld's reasoning is wedded so closely to the Sherman Act's
structure, Copperweld's language about parents and subsidiaries should
not be applied quickly to Robinson-Patman decisions. 5
Courts should hesitate especially before applying Copperweld to the
single seller doctrine. Copperweld explained that an interest in permitting
firms to organize themselves efficiently counseled restraint in applying
25'467 U.S. at 770-71.

at 774.
See supra note 174.
254 See supra notes 175-78.
255See supra note 179.
256 See supra Part IV and note 183.
27 But cf. supra notes 183-84 (parents may not be vicariously liable for their subsidiaries'
antitrust violations).
258But cf. cases cited supra notes 203-05 (applying Copperweld).
252 Id.
253
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the relatively strict rules of Sherman Act Section 1.25 Corporate efficiency
is enhanced by applying Copperweld to different purchaser cases such as
Security Tire. An interest in efficient internal corporate structures, however, counsels against treating the two corporations as one for the single
seller doctrine.260
b. Avoidance of a Perceived Anomaly Does Not Require
Extension of Copperiweld
The Caribe court was troubled by a perceived anomaly: If a parent and
wholly owned subsidiary are not a single seller, how can that subsidiary's
purchases not be those of a "different purchaser?" Although thejuxtaposition of these rules is facially worrisome, the court may have been unduly
concerned. Any anomaly would arise in fact (not just in theory) only
when the parent lacked sufficient control over the subsidiary. More important, the law will always have what can be considered anomalies: two
units regarded as one for the Sherman Act, or the Robinson-Patman
Act, or civil rights laws, or civil conspiracy, but not for corporate law
purposes, or RICO, or bankruptcy law, or criminal conspiracy. Given
the many different purposes of different bodies of law, consistency is
impossible. The presence of perceived inconsistency does not prove that
a decision is wrong.
Caribewas concerned particularly about the co-existence of inconsistent
rules for the Robinson-Patman different purchaser and single seller
doctrines. Other courts, as has been noted, have contemplated that the
two doctrines are or should be harmonious. Harmony could be achieved
by extending or limiting Copperweld, however, so harmony does not work
only toward Copperweld's extension. Moreover, since Copperveld's interest
in corporate efficiency works for the case's extension to the different
purchaser doctrine but against its extension to the single seller doctrine,26' courts should not overvalue harmony between these doctrines.26 2
259 467

U.S.

at 771, 773 ("Especially in view of the increasing complexity of corporate

operations, a business enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that serve
efficiency of control, economy of operations, and other factors dictated by business judgment without increasing its exposure to antitrust liability.").
260 This difference in efficiency consequences may be behind the Fifth Circuit's refusal
to extend Copperweld to single seller doctrine cases, see supra notes 214-17.
261 See supra text at note 260.
262Although Copperweld provides relatively little support for the Security Tire different
purchaser rule, there are otherjustifications. It is difficult to imagine how an intracorporate
price could harm competition, since no third party is affected until the product leaves the
corporate family, and there are so many alternative ways that a parent could subsidize a
subsidiary's operations if it wished to do so. Nor is it easy to see ajustification for interfering
with internal pricing. See Shelanski, supra note 201.
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c. Concern About Evasion of the Robinson-Patman Act
Should Not Be Overstated
The Caribe court was on somewhat firmer footing when it expressed
concern about the possibility that a different rule could encourage evasion of the Robinson-Patman Act. Whether a court agrees with that Act's
purposes or not, it is the law of the land unless Congress changes it, and
courts must uphold it.
Given the technical nature of Robinson-Patman, however, courts
should hesitate before concluding that something is improper evasion.
For instance, it is reasonably settled that a manufacturer may charge
a single price to all comers, even though such a policy disadvantages
wholesalers.2 63 A single-price policy may seem to harm the Act's interests
in fairness-and in limiting the advantages of chains, and so forth-but
few would advocate interpreting the Act expansively to prevent level
pricing. Firms are free to structure their operations to maximize efficiency consistent with the law, even though at times this will involve
taking steps that could be characterized as seeking to evade RobinsonPatman liability.
d. Caribe's Rule Potentially Creates Practical Problems
Before Caribe,Robinson-Patman counseling about pricing by subsidiaries was relatively straightforward. If a parent actively controlled a wholly
or partly owned subsidiary (and particularly its pricing), the parent was
likely responsible under Robinson-Patman for that subsidiary's pricing;
if there was no such control, the parent could price without regard to
what the subsidiary was doing or planning to do.2 64 Now, consider a
Robinson-Patman counselor's plight. In theory, active control remains
critical in most courts; but a corporation may not be confident what law
supra note 181, at 430.
supra note 184, at 124 ("Unless it can be demonstrated

263 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS,
264

See generally

KINTNER & BAUER,

that the parent corporation actually exercised some degree of control over its subsidiary's
pricing practices, usually there will be no Robinson-Patman Act problem. The presence
of common ownership and common directors does not, in itself, make two corporations
a single seller.") (citing Baim & Blank); Chris S. Coutroulis, Developments in Robinson-Patman
Law, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 454-55 (1989) ("where the subsidiary is truly independent
in its pricing and sales strategy, and is not simply a device to avoid the strictures of the
Robinson-Patman Act, dual selling-that is, selling by both the parent and the subsidiaryshould withstand Robinson-Patman scrutiny"); Robert M. Klein, The Robinson-Patman Act:
JurisdictionalAspects and Elements, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 777, 787 (1991) ("the control element
... is of determining importance"; "for compliance or planning purposes, the opportunity
to reach different customers through subsidiary operations without Robinson-Patman
constraint appears available if the seller is willing to assume the obligations of bona fide
entity separation"); Vawter, supra note 208, at 857 n.21 (corporate affiliation not enough;
"the critical inquiry is the extent to which the corporate parent controls the pricing decisions
of the wholly-owned subsidiary").
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will be applied to any particular transaction. Any court outside the Fifth
Circuit... may be persuaded to follow Caribe, which represents the views
of the First Circuit and the only Supreme Court Justice to address the
question.
Following Caribe is not as easy as it might seem, however. Some courts
have limited Copperweld to 100 percent stock ownership (with de minimis
exceptions permitted).266 Other courts have been more aggressive, ratcheting the bright line down to 51 percent ownership.2 67 If Copperweld
controls Robinson-Patman decisions, presumably Robinson-Patman law
will vary with the shifting reach of Copperweld; and, at present, a prudent
counselor would assume that a parent corporation might be responsible
for pricing by every majority-owned subsidiary.
Holding parent corporations automatically responsible for pricing decisions by majority-owned subsidiaries seems problematic.268 Business
considerations may make it important that subsidiaries price independently. 69 Parent corporations may need to remain removed from subsidiaries for nonantitrust legal reasons, moreover-most notably to prevent
some future plaintiff from relying on pricing interference to "pierce
the corporate veil., 270 If parent corporations were required to interfere
excessively with subsidiaries, we would have a true anomaly: a case (Copperweld) that sought to enhance business flexibility being applied in a
way that could reduce efficiency.
e. Conclusion of Appraisal
The First Circuit applied Copperweld too quickly to the single seller
doctrine. Attractive arguments support this application, but the application also raises serious concerns. Without benefit of briefing on the issue
the court failed adequately to address these concerns and make clear
the meaning of its holding.27'
265See Acme Refrigeration, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 785 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 848 (1986).
266 See supra note 46.
267See supra note 44.
268Caribe acknowledged that this area of law is "filled with difficulty." 19 F.3d at 750;

see Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990) (functional discount case discussed in
Stephen Calkins, The October 1989 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: Power, Access, and
Legitimacy, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 339, 366-75 (1990)).
269 Cf. Shelanski, supra note 201 (many factors affect sensible pricing).
270 See supra note 175.
271 One alternative would be to interpret Caribe as limited to the 100% ownership cases
discussed in Copperweld proper, and to leave to the future decisions about more difficult
cases.
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On the other hand, the Caribe court appears to have sensed that corporations can avoid Robinson-Patman limitations too easily by adding a
corporate layer; and perhaps the court is correct. The original single
seller case, Bairn & Blank, likely took a wrong turn when it imported the
narrow and unrelated "alter ego" concept from corporate law. 272 A more
general showing of control, and especially of control directly or indirectly
over pricing,2 73 ought to be sufficient. Nor would there seem to be sound
objection to presuming control (rebuttably) where there is substantial
equity domination (or perhaps even majority ownership), leaving it to
the corporate defendant, with its superior access to critical information,
to demonstrate distance.274 In short, Caribeaddressed an important issue
with insight, and it may have been well advised to prescribe change; but
the court was probably a little too quick to extend Copperweld's bright
line rule to this new context.
VI. CONCLUSION
Caribe is just one example of the extraordinary array of cases that have
addressed a seemingly unremarkable opinion. Copperweld supplied what
appeared to be a clear statement about the capacity of corporations to
conspire, but clarity continues to elude the courts. Judicial decisions
during the past decade have applied Copperweld's language and analysis
to fundamental nonconspiracy Sherman Act issues, and through this
process have helped build the legacy of the William Baxter-led Antitrust
Division. Other courts have struggled with whether to limit Copperweld
to the Sherman Act that supplied the structural core of the opinion. The
First Circuit, in Caribe, issued an impressive opinion that nonetheless
may have adopted too quickly a new application of Copperweld's bright line
rule. In retrospect, Copperweldappears to have raised as many questions as
it answered.

272Baim & Blank is discussed supra text at notes 209-12.
273 For an argument that control over pricing is important for the single seller doctrine
but not for the different purchaser doctrine, see Huddleston, supra note 201, at 969-70.
274 Recall that Acme Refrigeration, Inc. reserved on locating and measuring burden of
proof. See supra text at note 217.

